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Abstract 
We study a real supply chain environment from which specific information and 
knowledge can be extrapolated for other similar environments. We focus our research on 
the analysis of the interactions between members forming different teams (and between 
the teams themselves), and on the leader’s management of the supply chain. 
We note that there are many elements that contribute to the profitability of the 
network, which is dependent on the actions of the actors involved. We analyze certain 
characteristics that the actors have, such as their behavior, adaptation and learning levels, 
effort and willingness. Based on these components, we examine the performance of our 
actors and of the teams that the actors form. 
We provide specific calculations that take into account most of the components 
determining the added value to the system. One of the advantages of our main formula is 
that it can be used to monitor the progress of the actors, as well as it can help in the 
identification of problematic aspects impeding in the creation of value for the system.   
Our formula is very flexible and a modeler is able to adapt it to similar 
environments, providing him with great insight in the structures that he investigates. 
We study certain theoretical games from which we uncover certain information 
and characteristics of similar environments and settings. Moreover, we provide a real life 
example in order to truly understand the mechanism of the network, and validate our 
theoretical assessments.  
Moreover, we provide certain recommendations for a leader that is responsible for 
the supervision of actors (which have specific responsibilities) and the administration of a 
supply chain environment.  
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Part 1 
1.1. Introduction3 
 
There are many theories that treat and describe (theoretically) coalitions and 
coalition formation (i.e., behavior theories, group dynamics, social psychology, 
psychological studies, evolutionary studies, etc). For the purpose of this paper, we are 
interested in the reality of coalition maintenance. Thus, we study a real environment from 
which specific information and knowledge can be extrapolated for other similar 
environments and situations.  
Teamwork is critical for the success of any firm. Well-established companies 
focus on the training and education of their employees, and on the understanding of how 
their virtual enterprise works. In today’s dynamic, multi-level segregated information and 
interactions, and, simply put, complex economic-society, successful companies focus on 
the tangible aspects of their operations, on the virtual inter-intra-connectiveness, as well 
as on the operations of the teams forming within the company. It is through this global 
performance that the overall success of the company is measured. 
Any corporation must focus not only on the productivity (or revenues), but also 
on its employees, their development and on the interactions between the employees. In 
general, corporate companies focus on three aspects for the betterment of their 
employees: 
 
1. Key aspects of team behaviors that are critical for the team success; 
2. Diagnosing team behaviors (basically, identifying problematic behaviors); 
3. Suggesting courses of action corrections, if need be. 
 
In order to provide an adequate answer to these key components characterizing any team, 
we focus our research on individual agent actions, patterns of agents’ interaction, and 
three distinct (yet correlated) models: individual, multiple, and global team model. 
We analyze practical economic situations in which one cannot assume complete 
information for in real life situations there is no event where there is global complete 
information. Thus, the ability of agents to adapt to a changing environment (an 
environment where information is introduced sporadically and where information can 
change part of the setup of the environment) is essential. There are many examples where 
companies invest considerable time, resources and effort in order for their employees to 
be prepared for a change that is introduced. 
The environment that we study has many aspects relating to supply chain (SC) 
environments. In general, SC analysis is characterized by transfers of inventory between 
the different networks present in the chain. Our paper focuses on the obligations of 
actors, how actors fulfill these obligations, the behavior of actors, either taken 
individually or collectively as a team, and their added value to the company. 
The paper is set up in the following manner. In Part 1, we will have an overview 
of the literature and we will provide the basis for coalitions, as well as for supply chain 
environments. In Part 2, we will establish the characteristics of our game and the 
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responsibilities of the leader (that has certain control over the environment). Moreover, 
Part 2 will describe the payoff structure, provide the composition of the coalitions, and 
describe the different types our players’ behavior. The actions of our actors and our 
understanding of the former are also portrayed in Part 2. 
In Part 3, we will analyze the statistical data that we gathered, we will provide a 
further understanding regarding the payoffs to the actors, and we will describe in greater 
detail the core concept of a game. Moreover, we will analyze different games 
representing different situations that can arise in our environment. A detailed analysis of 
all the games that we study will also be provided in Part 3.  
We end our paper with general remarks and certain recommendations regarding 
similar environments studied.  
 
 
1.2. Overview 
 
In human constructed environments, laws regulate social interactions and 
behavior (either individual or collective). Laws impose certain influence and constrains 
on the manner people behave in their social interactions, interactions where conflict is 
present between individual (or collective) interests and where the common good is at risk. 
As a result, laws are a mechanism of aligning individual and collective interests through 
operative behaviors.4  
We observe that companies have well-established rules and regulations. Thus, we 
believe it is important to define and describe these vast terms. Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence 
tradition (Raz, 1980) refers to laws as ‘obligations backed by incentives’. Laws reflect 
certain rules of conduct, the obligations that are enforced by different means of penalties, 
and the rewards which refer to the incentives that an individual has. Obligations are 
people’s responsibilities under the specific law, what people are asked to do (or not to 
do). Incentives represent the positive or negative consequences people face if they follow 
or do not follow the specific obligations.  The implications of and how the latter influence 
individual behavior has been analyzed in different contributions of psychology and 
economics.5  
The corner stone of a rule is the influence it has on individual behavior. Analysis 
has proven that legal rules (laws) can influence to a certain extent individual behavior 
through different material payoffs – incentives.6 However, this view is limited in 
understanding why, for example, political parties obey legal rules if by disobeying the 
laws, the certain party (or actor, in our case) can relatively improve its payoff.7  
We take special notice of certain findings that Galbiati and Vertova (2008, p 155) 
arrive at regarding the obligations that affect the levels of average contributions to a 
public good. They also explore different situations where an unexpected increase in the 
minimum contribution triggers a temporary re-start in the cooperation (that previously 
deteriorated) between the members, while an unexpected reduction in the minimum 
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contribution does not alter the descending trend of cooperation.8 Another very interesting 
conclusion that Galbiati and Vertova (2008, p 159) have is that obligations have certain 
limits on individual behavior in social dilemmas.  
It has been proven that there is an expressive function in laws. Thus, rules and 
laws provide a coordination device that helps in the understanding and comprehension of 
individual’s beliefs about other’s behaviors.9  Moreover, regulations have a strong impact 
on psychological individual preferences. If the actors see the rules as fair (meaning that 
the same rules apply to all in the same manner), then the actors are ‘forced’ to revise their 
values and, subsequently, their conduct.10,11  
We point out that sanctions for non-cooperation could be understood through 
incomplete and very subtle contracts. Yet, this method is preferred with the intention to 
encourage a second chance for cooperation of the deviator (or the ‘lawless’) in order for 
the latter to have the opportunity to remedy himself.12 However, this strategy creates 
certain precedence, and it impacts the subtleness of (other) contracts that are opened to 
interpretation. If the specific laws and contracts are not applied correctly, the leader13 can 
be perceived as loosing his power (or authority) of influence because the latter creates the 
perception that he is inefficient. We also note that the lack of leader effectiveness or the 
illusion of it are almost equal in importance in a short time span.  
Mainstream economic and psychology literature has shown that both intentions 
and incentives play a key role in the manner that sanctions unfold.14 We also note that 
incentives refer to impersonal rules of law15, while intentions revolve around human 
beliefs and purposes. The lack of proper incentives is the main cause why threats of 
sanctions fail to induce cooperative behavior. In the same time, it has been proven by 
many researchers16 that intentions are deterministic elements.  Furthermore, researchers 
pointed out that the former also has an important role in shaping decisions.17 
One of the theories that explains certain aspects referring to the individuals’ 
actions and restrictions is cognitive dissonance theory. The latter theory (Festinger, 
1957), including self-serving biases (Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997), upholds the idea 
that people long to have consistent beliefs (resulting in consistent behavior)18. Consistent 
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behavior, consistent beliefs, self-serving biases (and other concepts of cognitive 
dissonance theory) can explain partly why intentions have a strong influence on the 
actions of individuals in economic environments.19,20  
We see a real need for analyzing individual behavior and the elements that 
influence cognition because they play an important role in today’s regular interactions. 
Moreover, cognitive psychology literature has shown that actors have a tendency to find 
similarities (varying from outside environment(s) to internal cognition processes) even 
though there are no assurances of their existence.21 
Alloy and Tabachnik (1984) suggest that having such consistencies helps 
researchers understand past behavior and predict future ones.22 Moreover, the same 
authors proved that certain types of obligations influence the rate of decline of 
cooperation over time, an aspect that is essential in our research. 
 
 
1.3. General remarks on coalition 
 
We know that politics, economics (and economy)23 are present in a corporation. 
Thus, in order to ‘survive’ in such an environment, one must be a member of an alliance 
(a coalition).  
In our research, we refer to teams as coalitions of different members that have a 
similar interest. We differentiate between business coalitions (strategic level), where 
business interests are at stake (over which the leader has full authority) and personal 
coalitions (social level), which denote similar personal interests of the actors (over which 
the leader has no authority and no control over them). 
In general terms, a coalition (besides being a multi-agent system) is an alliance 
among individuals or teams that engage in a common action for the accomplishment of a 
common purpose. We note that certain cooperative literature stipulates that coalition 
participants’ self-interests must be present for there must be a valid reason for the 
formation of the specific coalition. In our game, there are certain personal self-interests 
that are tangential to the interests of the coalition.24 However, personal interests have no 
relation with the formation of the work coalition. It is the leader that forms the business 
coalition. In our research, we focus on the latter type of the coalition, and we make the 
parallel between self-interests/personal interests (which may be represented in the 
literature as private goods) and business interests (which may reflect the public goods 
rational).  
We refer to a private good as a benefit that is only useful for a specific individual. 
A public good is a reward that is applied to the entire community (and to all members of 
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that community). In the same time, we do not disregard the presence of core(s) in our 
analysis.  
Game theory (GT) does not provide specific formulas that agents can employ to 
form coalitions. The former focuses on asserting, verifying, and validating stability and 
fairness by Kernel concepts, and on calculating the corresponding (side-) payments to 
(and between) agents. We point out that throughout our analysis, we circumvent certain 
aspects and problems that mainstream coalition literature has. In our example, even if we 
use GT, we resolve one such difficulty of coalition formation by a mechanism through 
which the leader appoints the members to a specific coalition. Thus, we do not allow 
agents to form the teams that they desire (besides a deviation coalition – situation that we 
will analyze in section 2.3. and 2.4.). The coalitions are imposed. Having this approach, 
we simplify the coalition formation processes. 
We note that there are three stages within the life of a coalition: 
 
a) Members convey together and form a coalition; 
b) Coalition maintenance, i.e. maintaining the coalition (excluding members; 
replacing excluded members); 
c) Coalition termination: end of the coalition. 
 
As stated before, we simplify steps a) and c) by providing the leader with control 
over these aspects. Our research focuses on the second step, coalition maintenance. 
 
 
1.4. On supply chain environments 
 
Game theory can help in expending the supply chain analysis (and literature), an 
environment where multiple agents are present and where diverging interests, objectives 
and directives exist.  
Supply chain management (SCM) analyses mainly the integration of information 
and resources in the flow of a network. Yet, in this analysis, one must pay particular 
attention to important elements of the network, such as location, transportation and 
logistics, inventory and forecasting, incentives, reverse logistics, strategic alliances, and 
(the quality of) services. One of the goals of SCM is to provide the best distribution of 
resources (whatever those may be). 
Even though GT is useful regarding some SCM aspects, in the same time, we 
acknowledge certain procedural limits when analyzing SCM using GT. One such 
difficulty is the fact that managers have problems in the implementation of mixed 
strategies, or determining what mechanisms must be utilized when determining mixed 
strategies. Another difficulty is the actual implementation of the specific mixed 
strategies. 
We focus our research on the analysis of the interactions, operationalization and 
management of a supply chain. 
We make certain distinctions between a network, a chain and a network chain. A 
network is an interconnected group that employs any method of sharing resources (may 
those be tangible or non tangible) between members or systems of the group in the 
purpose of gaining strength (of any manner). A chain is a well-organized structure 
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formed by a series of nodes that are connected, forming a whole, where one node is 
connected to at least two other nodes (excluding the first and last nodes). A network 
chain (supply chain or supply network)25 is a network of actors who coordinate the flow 
of information and resources, and cooperate in the process of converting the materials 
into products (or services) that are to be delivered to a client. 
We note that any action that influences, may that be positively or negatively, the 
end result is part of the network chain (NC). Also, the end-result of any supply chain is 
the creation of value to either the service or the product of which the chain specializes in. 
Moreover, the structure of the NC plays an important role in the manner success is 
achieved throughout the specific network.  
In order to better comprehend the characteristics of a supply network and how it 
applies to our game-environment, we will analyze: 1) the process, which identifies the 
mission and the procedures of the network; 2) the performance, which takes in 
consideration the variations in productivity/production and its reasons; and 3) the 
institution(al) perspective that refers to the network’s configuration and structure. 
Moreover, we point out that there must be a strategy for the implementation and 
realization of the imposed mission.  
One of the potential problems that a network-chain can exhibit is that some 
companies function in silos. A silo-company does not possess a powerful supply chain 
management. There is an unsynchronized decision-making process and lack of 
communication between silos that does not aid the company to properly face the 
challenges of the 21st century’s complex economy. The former brings unnecessary high 
cost activities to the specific business, thus loosing the company’s competitive 
advantage(s). 
Another difficulty, which is challenging to grasp, is that companies must deliver 
to its clients a quality product, in a short time-span, at a good price. In order to 
accomplish this, pertinent information (accurate and adequate) must be available for 
those involved in the planning and execution of the different stages of the network. Yet, 
this information may not be accessible and/or user-friendly. 
Throughout our paper, we will analyze some of the problems that corporations are 
facing regarding SCM, and we will try to provide certain recommendations to these 
difficulties. 
 
 
Part 2 
2.1. Characteristics of the game 
 
As stated before, we analyze a real life situation in order to better understand the 
mechanics of stable coalition structures. The environment (E) of the game is 
representative of a particular set of supply chain procedures that form a semi-opened 
loop. The end-result of our NC is a set of service(s) provided to different clients. 
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The game is characterized by three different teams, which together may form the 
total core (Level 0, L0)26. We also examine the grand coalition specific to each team, 
formed by its members (Level 1, L1). Thus, L1 illustrates the interactions of the 
individuals of the teams. The NC is established in four processes (Pni), which are 
executed by three different teams (Tn). Thus, we have27: 
 
a) Tn = {(T1, T2, T3)  Tn ≈→ L0)},  
where tni → Tni and tni’ ∈ Tni’;
28
 
 
b) Pn = {(P1, P2, P3, P4)  (P1A, P1B) ∈ P1;  
   (P2A, P2B, P2C) ∈ P2;  
(P3A, P3B, P3C) ∈ P3;  
(P4A, P4B) ∈ P4},  
where all process sets and sub-sets are specialized29; 
 
c) T1 = {(t1a, t1b) T1 ⌠ (P1, P2),  
where (t1a, t1b)  (P1, P2)}; 
 
d) T2 = {t2a, t2b, t2c, t2d, t2e, t2f}  T2 ⌠ P3,  
where (t2a, t2b, t2c, t2d)  (P3A),  
(t2e)  (P3B),  
(t2f)  (P3C)}; 
 
e) T3 = {(t3a, t3b)  T3 ⌠ P4 ,  
where (t3a)  (P4A),  
(t3b) (P4B)}. 
 
We have represented in Table 2 the description of the sets (and subsets) of the 
teams and processes, and we have provided in Figure 1 the workflow of our NC.  
In such a structure, we have two major coordination perspectives: 1. vertical 
(between teams); and 2. horizontal (between the members of a specific team). For this 
reason, dynamic interactions between the members of the teams and between the teams 
themselves are encouraged. Moreover, we specify that the members of a team (or sub-
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 We have mentioned that we are interested in business coalitions (public goods). Analysis of a public 
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analyze the same situation from a political economy point of view. 
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specific team. 
29
 A specialized set or sub-set denotes a process that is covered by a specific team. No other team can cover 
and execute a process which it is not specialized in.  
 9 
team) have symmetric roles. However, teams do not have a symmetric role due to our NC 
setup. 
There is a predetermined production schedule where complete information 
regarding the amount of the demand of the service(s) is not provided by too much time in 
advance. Yet, members and teams are responsible and accountable for meeting specific 
expectations. Even if the overall process (procedural supply chain) is imposed by the 
leader, members have control over sub-processes, thus creating a semi-decentralized 
decision making process. We observe that the dynamics of the system increase having 
this approach. The overall success is dependent on the decisions and actions of the 
members of the teams. Moreover, the leader has a supervisory role where he verifies the 
end result. 
We note that the Service Demand Harmonization (SDH) is of two (2) hours, 
which means that the members of the teams have two hours to complete P1 to P4. The 
quantity of the services rendered would suffer if the SDHs were not met30. In the same 
time, all teams’ members must pay particular attention to the quality of their work, which 
is indicated in the overall quality of the services rendered by our Administrative Services 
Unit (ASU).  
Moreover, our game is played daily because there is a one-day business cycle (no 
work is left for the following day).31  
 
 
2.2. Leader  
 
 The leader (referred also as protocol manager) plays a central role within our 
game set-up. He has two key responsibilities: 1. customer service (being a liaison 
between the members of a team, between the teams, between teams and members, and 
between his direct reports and the other Business Units/departments (BUs)); 2. to oversee 
the good operation of his teams. The last attribute is broken in different subcategories: a) 
provide assistance to his direct reports and to his teams; b) he is responsible for the 
performance of all the functions within his department. 
Moreover, planning and forecasting undergone by the leader are essential in the 
network. The accuracy of these two elements impacts the performance and processes of 
the network. We note that leader effectiveness can be measured by the procedures 
implemented and by the level(s) at which actors follow them. 
The leader must be flexible and must be able to implement customized tasks 
imposed by the outside system, i.e. properly respond to the demand(s) of the 
environment. He must adapt fast and bring the team(s) to accept and follow the specific 
change. Thus, the protocol manager is also responsible for the distribution and 
redistribution of the tasks among the members of the coalition. 
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 This is transferred to the team through negative payoffs. 
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 This setup is a simplification of the real procedures of a normal day within ASU. Processing incoming 
mail, prepping and scanning the documents (and cheques) is done between 8.30 and 12.30. The first SDH 
ends at 10.30, while the second SDH ends at 12.30. As of 13.30 (to 17.00), not only that the imaging team 
(member wise) is reduced, but their tasks are different. In the afternoon, t2i, t3a and t3b focus on responding 
to requests of internal clients from other business units. Meanwhile, T1, in contrast with the morning where 
it focuses on processing incoming mail, it focuses on processing outgoing mail in the afternoon. 
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In order for the teams (as well as the individuals) to perform at their best 
capacities (and capabilities), the leader must be capable to provide adequate social 
engineering and instill a specific social identity in the network. The cohesion of the 
members of the teams as well as between the teams themselves are an important task that 
the leader must take in consideration and to which he must allocate the necessary time 
and resources.  
Moreover, beliefs learning and environmental adaptation play a central role in the 
daily behavior of actors. It is the leader that must provide the tools that are needed for the 
development of both staff as well as the latter’s sets of beliefs (effective and appropriate).  
Specific decisions must be accurate and taken in a timely manner by the leader. 
Thus, because dynamics are involved, there are continuous-time processes which are 
important in the normal flow of operations. Dynamic optimization of interactions is 
essential. Therefore, the leader must create an environment that is prone to 
communication between the members of all teams as well as between the teams 
themselves. 
The leader is also responsible for the payment of the payoffs (positive or 
negative) to the actors and to the teams for he is accountable for the overall performance 
(individual as well as collective). The latter can be measured through the accuracy of 
procedural benchmarks and follow-ups. 
There are certain restrictions and conditions that the leader imposes. For this 
reason, the leader may be seen by the actors as dictatorial. One such example is the 
manner in which he assigns the members of the teams. Members of the team are pre-
assigned (by the leader), i.e. actors cannot choose their own team. When creating the 
teams and when introducing a new member in the team, the leader must take in 
consideration the following aspects and characteristics of an actor (yet, not restricted only 
to them): the competences that he possesses, his ability (and willingness) to learn new 
tasks, his ability to adapt to a changing environment, the impact on the other team 
members, and his capability to adapt to the team that he will be a member of (and to 
function efficiently and effectively within that team). It is on this basis that we consider 
the leader as the architect of the teams. We address the basis on which the leader assigns 
an actor to a team in section 2.4. 
The leader must always address individual challenges and must work together 
with the actors in order for them to surpass expectations  personal as well as the ones 
imposed by the team. The same rational applies also to the needs of a team.  
In order to understand clearly the dynamics of the interactions, we must 
comprehend the system from the leader’s perspective32, as well as from the perspective of 
the teams’ members33. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32
 Thus, understanding the game where the leader establishes the variable(s) that influences the state of the 
system. 
33
 Thus, understanding and analyzing differential games  using calculus of variables and optimal control 
theory (see Kamien and Schwartz, 2000)  where several individuals select the variables. 
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2.3 Payoffs 
All payoffs depend on the type of coalition structure that is developed. The former 
rely on the efficiency of the entire team, consequently, on the effectiveness of the 
members and on the dynamic structural configuration that is formed. Payoffs are 
dependent on the feedback received by the different BUs (provided to the teams by the 
leader), thus creating externalities to our game set-up. Members belonging to the same 
team receive the same team payoff because their duties are similar. Positives and negative 
payoffs depend on the actions of the previous day(s) as well as on those of the current 
day, and they are paid by the leader as he sees appropriate.34 Therefore, the payoff 
provided by the leader to the team has the following form: 
 
Tϕλ = Σf(λϕdx),      (2.3.1) 
 
where we have payoff ϕ, leader λ,  the function f(λϕdx) denoting the payment rational, 
and d working days with d ∈ D = {d1, d2, d3, d4, d5}35. 
 The same process for payment of the payoffs applies to the actors also. Thus, the 
payoff received by an individual that belongs to Tn is:  
 
ϕi = [ni/(ni – 1)]Tϕλ + ϕλ + δϕi +      
        + c1Σtni ∈ Tnx
 (ϕtni) + c2Σtni ∉ Tnx (ϕtni),     (2.3.2) 
 
where i is a specific actor, tni is a member of Tn receiving the specific payoff, ni 
representing the number of members in the team that tni belongs to, c1 and c2 are the 
coefficients representing the weight of the payoff36 received by a member from other 
members of the same team and from members of a different team, respectively. We note 
that the term [ni/(ni – 1)]Tϕλ is formed by the team’s payoff and a coefficient c > 1 
relative to how many members are in a specific team. Σ
tni ∈ Tnx
 (ϕtni) and Σtni ∉ Tnx (ϕtni) 
represent the sum of all the payoffs that an actor receives from members of their team and 
members of diffferent teams, respectively. 
Therefore, we note that the leader provides a payment to an individual, and that 
actor also receives other types (different sources) of payments. 
We specify that payments may be granted more than once a day, depending on the 
outcomes of the actions of the actors/teams37, and the payoffs are caped. In the same 
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 Operational mistakes may not be necessarily identified immediately. They can be revealed on a latter 
date. After a five (5) working day period, all mistakes (if any) have been signaled and responded to. 
35
 d is a refinement of our system. We will not use it in our analysis for simplicity reasons. Moreover, the 
term Σλϕ(d) captures all payoffs provided by the leader to the team.  
36
 The weight of the payoff is assigned by the actor and represents the importance that the latter attributes to 
the source of that specific payoff. 
37
 However, we advise that after each SDH period, the leader should provide the team with the payoffs (of 
that specific SDH period) in order for the members of the teams to know the quality of the work that they 
are doing, if they require to adapt to new situations, and not to leave the members without payment for the 
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time, once a payment is granted, that payment cannot be retracted. Also, there are no 
recursive payments for the same action. 
Members of teams can provide other members with side payments. However, we 
point out that there are non-transferable positive (or negative) payoffs allowed between 
the players for the formation of a coalition(s). The latter statement contradicts the basis of 
cooperative literature.38 We answered in section 2.2. (and we will analyze this aspect in 
greater detail in section 2.4.) to a very important question: how are the teams formed if 
there are no payments allowed between tns (in order to form Tni)? The leader appoints 
actors to a specific team. 
We note however that side payments between Tns are permitted in order for the 
possibility to form the total core L0 (providing greater possibilities for the core. See 
section 3.2.2. and 3.2.3. for a detailed description).  
We consider a member of a coalition myopic if he is only concerned with his 
immediate payoffs. Individualistic behavior is penalized from different sides, in such a 
way that actors engaged in myopic strategies (aiming also at deviation), as well as 
nonmembers, receive negative payoffs.39,40 These payoffs are assigned by the 
independent team actors (acting individually and independently of the team), by the team, 
as well as by the leader. This is a control that brings the coalition deviator in an ‘outcast’ 
position, situation that creates and influences the degree of his cognitive pessimism. At 
this stage, cognitive dissonance is present for the deviator, and the latter must engage in 
different mental processes in order to reduce the dissonance between the normal 
cognitions and the environmental ones. 
In order to avoid myopism, deviation and the presence of acute cognitive 
pessimism, behavioral change mechanisms must be put in place such that actors are 
encouraged to be proactive members of the team(s) and must uphold their respective 
coalition(s) (notwithstanding different positive payoffs that represent positive 
reinforcement). Therefore, the leader is responsible for creating and maintaining the team 
spirit, the willingness of an actor to be part of the team.  
Worst payoff is to be fired, meaning that the leader not only terminates the actor’s 
membership to a team, but that actor is fully taken out of play. This is the greatest 
sanction that a leader may inflict to an individual. As Leon Petrosian (HEC 2008)41 stated 
very clearly, this payoff is characterized as ‘sudden death’ for the actor in the game. This 
sanction is used as a last resort. 
The deviation payoff function to a member of a team is the following:  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
work done. The sooner the individuals receive their payoff, the better it is for the entire system, and 
especially for the individuals. Payment of rewards (or penalties) should occur as soon as possible. 
38
 In most cooperative literature, side payments between members of a team not only that are permitted, but 
are essential for it is through the payment mechanism that members form coalitions. 
39
 They do not have a 0 (zero) payment for this would mean there is a status quo situation. Having a 
negative payoff properly illustrates the impediments that the nonmember imposes on the team. 
40
 These payoffs are given to the individual regardless of the team he is in. The direct payoff of the team 
(value of the coalition in GT format) is not affected. Yet, the congruent payoff (Coalition Factor Estimation 
(CFE) analyzed in section 3.2.2.) of the team is affected for the latter is composed by all individualistic 
payoffs of each member. 
41
 Workshop on Dynamic Games in Management Science, 2008, Cooperation and Bargaining section. 
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δϕi = λϕδ + c1Σtni ∈ Tnx (ϕδtni) + c2Σtni ∉ Tnx (ϕδtni),    (2.3.3) 
 
where δ is the deviation weight (and δ is negative).  
The leader must ensure that appropriate sanctions mechanisms are in place; if they 
are not present, the leader must create them. We note that sanctions must be applied as a 
correction method to the individual (or to the team) that is not following procedures. 
Moreover, the former must be proportionate to the error in question. However, we note a 
grey zone (in which extensive research has already been made) in which individuals must 
be able to acknowledge the difference between credible and non-credible threats imposed 
by the leader.42 The deviation coefficient is representative of the sanctions mechanisms 
that either the leader creates or that the team (or individuals of a team) may impose on a 
deviator.  
We note that there is no individual best reply strategy(ies) for deviators. Any 
individual player knows that if he deviates, it will be enough to precipitate a decrease in 
productivity of the remaining coalition. Moreover, it is common knowledge that a 
decrease in productivity or quality will be panelized. 
The reason why the payoffs are caped is that neither teams’ members, teams, not 
even the leader, can provide a payment that is not lawful within the system (the 
company).43 Thus, the payoffs’ minimum and maximum values (especially the maximum 
ones) are following strict rules, regulations and policies imposed by the corporation and 
the department. The leader does not have great flexibility in increasing the range of the 
payoffs (increasing the maximum payoff enforced by the system). However, we note that 
different systems may have different scales. Moreover, for our game set-up, all variables 
described in Table 3 belong to N. If one requires the values to belong to R, we see no 
inconvenience. 
 We remark that ϕλ (from (2.3.2)) and λϕδ (from (2.3.3)) are mutually exclusive. 
A player cannot receive a positive payoff from the leader for a job well done and in the 
same time receive a negative payoff because the player is deviating. The terms c1, c2 are 
positive for a player cannot assign a negative value to a payoff that he received from 
other members of his team or other teams.      
 
 
2.4. Coalition 
 
Individuals are brought into the specific environment based on certain 
competence matrixes, on their previous experiences, on their willingness and capacity to 
learn new tasks. Moreover, the actor’s ability to adapt to the team to which he will be 
allocated, as well as the willingness of the team to ‘incorporate’ the new member to the 
team, play a central role in the leader’s decision to hire the candidate. The leader must 
analyze all the information available to him.   
                                                 
42
 Non-credible-threats is a tool that is used more often by teams vs. teams or teams vs. individual. The 
leader can use this method also, however we advise not to employ it often. If the actors realize that the 
leader uses non credible threats, the leader might be challenged, loose power of influence, etc.  
43
 Refer to Table 3 in the Appendix for the payoff regulations and values.  
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Once the actors are appointed to the specific team, there are two aspects to be 
considered: 1) old team members must accept the new addition to the team; 2) the new 
member of the team must understand how the team works and adapt to the new 
environment. Only once these two elements are accomplished, the leader can address the 
team as an entity by itself. The leader works closely with the team and with the new 
member in order to have an easy transition/integration.  
The leader sets the roles, duties and responsibilities of all the actors (information 
that is common knowledge to all actors). Once the team is formed, the leader must be 
aware of how the specific coalition structure functions for he is responsible for the overall 
operations. Yet, he is not required to monitor all the team’s interactions. The latter has a 
life of its own.44 The reason why the leader must know the dynamics of the coalition 
structure is that if he is required to intervene (on an individual basis, or at the team level), 
he would have the necessary knowledge of the dynamics as well all the necessary 
information before he addresses the situation. No additional research or preparation is 
required for the leader. The latter can intervene very quickly to remedy the situation, if 
need be.  
The behavior, actions and involvement of one member of the network influence 
(and has a direct impact on) the production and performance of all other members (or 
teams) in the specific network, thus he has a direct influence on the profitability of the 
network. Moreover, the overall value of the coalition depends upon the actions of actors 
in the coalition, thus on the members themselves. In the same time, the coalition strength 
is determined by what it can achieve on its own [uT* = f(m)]; nonmembers are not taking 
in consideration.  
The leader must implement programs that result in an efficient and effective 
coalition structure. These programs must induce the coalitions to be farsighted and the 
actors must have an attitude free of deviation (procedures). The overall success of the 
coalition (which is based on the final payoffs) is the principal target of coalitions. 
In order to ensure a high performance level of the chain, open information 
exchanges are required. The information must be available to all actors as soon as it is 
available. Moreover, the negative implications of poor coordination can have very drastic 
consequences, which can bring the destruction of the individual teams, or even that of the 
entire network. We note that information flows both ways: top-down (leader informs the 
actors); and, bottom-up (actors inform the leader). 
We have the subsequent definition for a coalition: 
 
Definition 1: In order for a coalition to be possible, we need the following elements: 
 
-there is a finite set T of players ti, where ti ≥ 2; 
-uT* is the value of the coalition, where u(∅) = 0.45 
  
We specify that the value of the coalition is constant (and it is based on a typical 
day)46. uT* would increase iff. the members of the teams are faced with difficult (out of 
                                                 
44
 If the leader becomes a fully active member of the team, he will loose his leader authority. His role is to 
lead the specific team.  
45
 See section 3.2.2. for a detailed description of the value of the game and the core of the game. 
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the normal) situations and they address the latter in an adequate manner. We note that the 
leader would increase the payment to both the members and the teams only in out-of-the-
ordinary situations47. Once the environment regains its equilibrium (normal state of 
affairs), uT* would come back to the original constant value.  
Members of teams can deviate from their teams (from the collective unit rational; 
a member can isolate himself; he is not supporting the team, the members of his team, 
and the other members/teams, etc.). The deviation can go up to the point where the 
individual fully excludes himself from the team. In the case that there are two players that 
are deviating in the same time, they can try to form a deviator coalition (it is a 
psychological effect that the deviator(s) (in our case, the individual) have. They do not 
want to be singled out – forming singletons – thus, they look for an allegiance with 
another member(s)). In the situation where there is a deviator coalition, the leader would 
address the deviators individually, not the deviator coalition. It is easier to persuade the 
individual than the coalition.48  
We had the opportunity to test the previous theoretical assessment in real live 
situations. Throughout our research, there were four occasions of multiple simultaneous 
deviations (more than one member deviated in the same time period and where the 
deviators formed a coalition). On three occasions, the issues were addressed on an 
individualistic basis; this approach resulted in the issues been resolved. Only on one 
occasion the leader addressed the entire deviator coalition, process that did not bring any 
positive results. The former then addressed the issues on an individual basis. All the 
problems that the actors had were fixed, and the actors re-integrated their specific teams 
(stopped being deviators and stopped pursuing deviation). Even though our statistical 
data pool was not large, we are convinced that the best course of action for the leader is 
to address similar situations on an individualistic basis. 
 We illustrate in the following manner the deviator and the remaining members of 
team in (2.4.1), and ∆T as the deviator coalition (2.4.2): 
 
tniδ ∈ {tni} tni → Tni ∴ Tni = {(tniδ), [(tni) – (tniδ)]};   (2.4.1) 
 
tniδ ∈ ∆T iff. i > 1  tn∀iδ ∈ ∆T .     (2.4.2) 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
46
  A typical day in ASU is characterized by the following events: 1) mail – a. an average of 520 envelopes 
either to be dispatched or opened for the imaging team; b. 3 address changes; c. an average of outgoing 
mail for Canada Post of 1250 pieces, 120 pieces for UPS, and 2 pieces for QA courier; d. a weekly average 
of 3 changes; 2) imaging – a. an average of 1200 documents prepped and scanned (including checks); b. 
answering queues; c. a weekly average of 4 changes. In both mail and imaging sub-departments there are 2 
to 4 difficult situations. We note that not all the issues can be addressed by the players. If this is the case, 
then the leader is responsible for the proper handling of the specific issues.  
47
 Out-of-the-ordinary situations refer to: complicated demands; complicated documents; players absent; 
spike in volumes; late receipt of mail. 
48
 Different deviators have different reasons for their deviation. The leader must understand and address 
each individual need of the deviator(s), trying to bring him/them out of deviation. Moreover, addressing 
individual needs is easier than addressing the needs of the collective. Psychology and negotiation situations 
have provided different examples regarding this aspect. 
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If a deviator coalition ∆T exists, then an additional negative payoff is paid by the 
leader to ∆T. Moreover, uT* would decrease if one of the following conditions is present: 
a) if ∆Tti ≥ 1; b) if the members are not following procedures, thus incurring mistakes.  
We recall that if ∆Tti = 1, creating thus a singleton, the deviator has a certain 
degree of pessimism regarding the structure that he is a member of, or regarding the 
environment in which he is placed. These are the aspects that the leader must identify and 
address with the deviator. 
We also take note that there is a possibility where the team might exclude a 
member in order to receive a bigger payoff49. However, all present members must 
participate to the work done, information that is common knowledge. In this situation, the 
leader will penalize the team (not taken in consideration the member that was excluded). 
The rational for the team’s penalty is due to the fact that the team surpassed their role, 
farsighted strategies were not used, the team did not act as a collective unit, and the team 
did not inform the leader of the need/want/willingness to exclude a member (the team’s 
desire). It is the leader’s responsibility to exclude (thus terminate) a member of a team.  
We require a coalition configuration (specific to each team) that is stable and 
optimal in terms of utility maximization. A core partition is stable in the sense that there 
is no reason for a deviation to take place.50 However, we point out that certain problems 
related to incentives of cyclical coalitional deviations might be present. It is optimal in 
the sense that not only the members of a team work in concert in order to accomplish a 
specific goal, but also the actors try to maximize the dynamic function of the payoff.  
We also note that one person might deviate unwillingly. This is a situation where 
the not-work-related environment has a strong influence on an actor. Due to human 
nature, one cannot fully dissociate personal-life and work-life. Because we are analyzing 
work situations, we have to acknowledge the fact that actors’ work (and behavior) is 
influenced (positively or negatively) by events in their personal life. If the latter’s 
influence is significant, then the actor would not be able to focus on his work, or he will 
be absent minded; the result will be an unwilling deviation (besides the procedural 
mistakes that the actor makes). 
Any coalition requires a protocol (of specific duties), as well as strategies (that 
can be employed in order to achieve a specific goal). Moreover, we point out that a 
coalition may only be as strong as its weakest member. In the same time, uT* for one 
coalition is not dependent on uT* of another coalition. Each team has its own coalition 
value.  
 
 
2.5. Types of behavior 
 
There is a slight difference in the analysis undergone by cooperative GT and by 
non-cooperative GT. Cooperative GT analyses a game from the perspective of the value 
created through the cooperation of the players. Thus, it focuses on the outcome of the 
                                                 
49
 Let us say that one member is doing procedural mistakes; this is translated in a low uT*. If the team 
excludes that member (tx ∉ Tx), the work load is divided between the members of Tx, then uT* would 
increase.  
50
 This refers to the Nash equilibrium (NE) where a player has a NE.  
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game. Non-cooperation GT aims at understanding the specific actions of players. In order 
to have a clear understanding of the situation, one must utilize both cooperation and non-
cooperation analysis. Thus, a powerful method that a modeler might see useful is to 
change a cooperation game in a non-cooperation game and/or vice versa. 
Once a player is assigned to a team, he can have only three different types of 
behavior (regarding the team that he is a member of, as well as towards other teams):  
 
i. Cooperative behavior (Cb) – where he supports the team; 
ii. Non-cooperative behavior (NCb) – where he is either aiming at deviation or 
already a deviator (non-member of the team);51  
iii. Non-adaptive behavior (NAb) – having the same behavior as before he joined the 
coalition.52  
 
As stated before, there are strategic and dynamic interactions between members 
and teams. Cb is strongly encouraged by the leader and by the other members of the team. 
Meanwhile, the actors know that individual prolonged NCb (and NAb)53 will have the 
worst outcome: the person would be terminated and taken out of the game. 
In order to transform NCb into Cb (or NAb in Cb), the actors are forced to use 
farsighted strategies where all actors must act as a collective unit. One of the reasons for 
farsightedness is that the members of the teams want to keep their membership to the 
team in which they belong, thus maintain their employment. We note that the individual 
as well as the collective payoffs are important in the type of behavior that is adopted, and 
players change their behavior due to incentives (either positive or negative) – i.e., the 
payoffs. Moreover, research has shown that obligations (supported by low incentives) 
cannot sustain cooperation in repeated interactions.54  
The environmental behavior β55 of a player i has the following form: 
 
βi = q’Cbi + q”NCbi + q’”NAbi      (2.5.1) 
{≡ [1–(q”+q’”)] Cbi + [1–(q’+q’”)] NCbi + [1–(q’+q”)] NAbi},  
 
where βi is the behavior of a player, and q’, q” and q’” are percentages that reflect the 
probability of the actor choosing either Cbi, NCbi or NAbi, such that 1 = q’ + q” + q’”. 
After the integration of an actor in our system, NAbi = 0, and the term q’”NAbi 
{[1–(q’+q”)] NAbi} is taken out of the equation.56  
                                                 
51
 Deviation refers to his lack of support to the network (lack of support regarding Tn – thus, regarding tni) 
– or lack of support impeding for Tn ≈→ L0.  
52
 This type of behavior can occur after the introduction of a new player in the network.  
53
 We note that prolonged NAb is transformed in NCb. 
54
 Galbiati and Vertova (2008), p 160. 
55
 This refers to the behavior of an actor regarding his environment: towards the team that he is a member 
of, towards members of the team, towards other teams, towards other members, etc. 
56
 See section 3.1.1. for more details. 
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Moreover, we note that there are different forms of behavior available to the 
actors in each set of behaviors. Their choice is influenced by many elements (or 
conclusions).57  
 
 
2.6. Actions  
 
We note that actions and processes are not similar. Being engaged in the 
accomplishment of a process requires an (process-) action. However, in (2.5.1), we are 
referring to behavioral-actions, not to process-actions.  Moreover, the beliefs of an actor 
shape the way the actor sees his environment. We also point out that the environment 
influences the formation, shaping and annihilation of beliefs of actors.58  
We denote ait as action i of player t, where ai ∈ A, A being the set of feasible 
actions (permitted or not by the system and leader). We point out that A is comprised of 
many types of actions (team related, work related, individual related, process related, 
etc.). Moreover, an action permutation is the vector of actions a = (a1, …, ai) that has the 
following form ai:ti. When all players engage in the same action, we have a uniform 
action combination that is translated to the progress of the team in the same direction.  
We acknowledge that the action-function is also dynamic and it is dependent on 
the individual, his beliefs, his perceptions, his actions. Player ti’s value of action(s) (and 
consequently their work beliefs) should be consistent with the following linear rule: 
 
ai:ti =  (adati ⋅ lti)(ap.k)  +       GLOQ 
+ βti + βTni + βti(Tni) ⋅ adati +     OBR   
+ ϕσti ⋅ (eff.ti + wti)
ϕσti
  -     MOT 
- s ⋅ (adati + lti)/(adati ⋅ lti),      TAL 
        (2.6.1) 
 
where we have the player’s adaptation coefficient adati, player’s learning coefficient lti, 
βti is the player’s behavior, the player’s team behavior βTni, player’s behavior demanded 
by his team denoted by βti(Tni), player’s payoff stimulation ϕσti, player’s effort 
coefficient eff.ti, player’s willingness coefficient wti, and time index s with s > 1.  
 We note that one player cannot have more than one ai:ti permutation 
simultaneously (or during the same time period). Moreover, the cumulative actions of the 
players determine the Coalition Factor Estimation (CFE) (û). Thus, 
 
                                                 
57
 See Popp (2006a) for details of conceptual conglomerates (ConCs). 
58
 For further details on beliefs (their influence on the learning process and their effect of knowledge and 
purposes, which determine the actions of an individual), see Popp (2009) and (2006a), respectively.  
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Σai:ti∈T =  ûTti .
59
       (2.6.2) 
 
 We point out that ûT refers to the added value of the specific team to the 
environment, to the department, and consequently to the entire company.     
We remark that there is a finite set of possibilities that a player can create. Thus, 
there is a set X of states and the state space X is finite. Moreover, the actions undertaken 
by the individuals, and thus their outcomes (the value of the actions), are related to the 
payoffs received by the players.  
We point out that a modeler can construct different (types of) vectors for the 
illustration of the relationship between actions and payoffs. 
 
GLOQ 
The GLOQ term [(adati ⋅ lti)(ap.k)] refers to the global quality of the work done.
60
 
We note that higher coefficients for adati and lti will signify a higher adaptation level and 
a more rapid learning, respectively. The product (adati ⋅ lti)(ap.k) represents the applied 
knowledge that a player has and is engaged in for the work (process-action) that he has to 
perform. Moreover, adati refers to the overall adaptation of the player to his environment: 
to the team(s), to the work necessities, to change, to demands, etc. lti represents the 
player’s learning capabilities that take in consideration the different methods of learning, 
the time required for the player to learn a topic (or a process), different approaches to the 
treatment of information61.  
We acknowledge that adati and lti are directly correlated, and the relationship 
between adati and lti that the leader is looking for in an actor prior to the actor’s 
introduction to our game environment is: 
 
       lti ≥ ;adati;     
  g(adat,lt) 
       2 ≥ lti – adati.      (2.6.3) 
 
Table 4 illustrates the values associated to each level of learning for an individual 
in our game setup.62 
 
OBR 
The overall behavior requisites term (OBR) [βti + βTni + βti(Tni) ⋅ adati] is 
composed by all the behavior demands made on the player. OBR takes into account the 
                                                 
59
 We note that uT* is not the same as ûT*  
60
 We use the assumption (Assumption 4) that a high level of adaptation and learning (which refer to the 
specific applied knowledge to the process in question) will result in a good quality work. See Proof 1 of the 
Appendix. 
61
 See Popp (2009) for learning process and what elements influence the learning process.  
62
 We note that the levels (as well as the values) can vary from game setup to game setup, they can depend 
on the environment, and also on the level of accuracy that either a modeler or a leader is looking for.  
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behavior of the player, the behavior of the team, and a measurement formed by the 
behavior demanded by the team on the behavior of the player and the player’s adaptation 
capacity to this demand. Most of the time the team’s behavior and the behavior that the 
team demands from the player are the same [βTni ≡ βti(Tni)]   Thus, we can write OBR in 
the following way: 
 
βti + βTni + βti(Tni) ⋅ adati = βti + βTni + βTni ⋅ adati.    (2.6.4) 
 
 The leader will always impose a cooperation behavior to the team (and within the 
team), thus cooperation from all the members of the team.63 Therefore, we rewrite (2.6.4) 
as: 
 
βti + βTni + βTni ⋅ adati = βti + Cbi + Cbi ⋅ adati  
  = βti + Cbi ⋅ (1 + adati).   (2.6.5) 
 
As stated before, we are aware that there are coefficient levels that determine (and 
characterize) how engaged the actors are in the specific type of behavior. We describe in 
Table 5 the different values associated to cooperation and non-cooperation behaviors. 
We note that a value of zero (0) for βti signifies that the actor is neither engaged 
in cooperation nor non-cooperation. However, if this is the case, then we assign the actor 
a value of weak non-cooperation for he is not ‘helping’ his environment. This is 
translated to an apathetic player.  
Considering (2.6.5) and replacing βti from (2.5.1), we have: 
 
q’Cbi + q”NCbi + q’”NAbi + Cbi ⋅ (1 + adati).   (2.6.6)   
 
Cbi and NCbi are of interest to us. NAbi is taken in consideration only when new 
players are brought in the system. Let us assume for now q’”NAbi = 0. Thus, we have 
from (2.6.6): 
 
q’Cbi + q”NCbi + Cbi ⋅ (1 + adati).     (2.6.7) 
 
Moreover, cooperative and non-cooperative behaviors are mutually exclusive 
when an actor is engaged in a specific action. A player cannot be cooperative and non-
cooperative in the same time regarding the same issue. However, we note that during the 
course of one day, an actor can have both cooperative behaviors and non-cooperative 
behaviors.  
Thus, if an actor is engaged in cooperative behavior, we have from (2.6.7): 
 
                                                 
63
 Even though the leader demands cooperation from the members of the teams, they may choose not to 
cooperate. If this is the case, we have a ∆T. 
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q’Cbi + Cbi ⋅ (1 + adati),      (2.6.8) 
 
and if the actor is engaged in non-cooperative behavior, we have: 
 
 q”NCbi.        (2.6.9) 
 
We note that in (2.6.9), adati is not present. This illustrates correctly reality for in 
a situation where an individual upholds a non-cooperative behavior, he is not supporting 
his team, he is not adapting to the environment; thus, there is no need for that actor to 
adapt to anything. 
Moreover, we note that in (2.5.1), the probabilities that an actor may cooperate or 
not cooperate are present. However, in (2.6.8) and (2.6.9), even though q’ and q” are 
present, we can make both of them equal to 1. As stated before, cooperation and non-
cooperation are mutually exclusive. Thus, we have 
 
Cbi + Cbi ⋅ (1 + adati) = Cbi ⋅ (2 + adati);   (2.6.10) 
OBR 
NCbi.        (2.6.11) 
 
 
MOT 
The motivation term (MOT) [ϕσti ⋅ (eff.ti + wti)
ϕσti] is composed by the player’s 
payoff stimulation ϕσti, the player’s effort coefficient eff.ti, and the player’s willingness 
coefficient wti. We note that the payoff stimulation ϕσti has the following form: 
 
ϕσti = ϕcti
 – ϕr(s-1)ti
,       (2.6.12) 
 
where ϕcti
 represents the payoff considered by ti, the time index s with s > 1, and ϕr(s-1)ti
 
represents the payoff received by ti in (s-1) (referring to the last payoff received). 
There are three possibilities for ϕσti: 
ϕcti
 > ϕr(s-1)ti
 ∴ ϕσti > 0; 
ϕcti
 = ϕr(s-1)ti
 ∴ ϕσti = 0; 
ϕcti
 < ϕr(s-1)ti
 ∴ ϕσti < 0. 
 
We note that ϕr(s-1)ti
 is a fact for ti received the payment ϕti. However, ϕcti
 is 
considered from the player’s perspective and is considered as a future possible event.  
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If ϕσti > 0, then MOT is positive, and this signifies that the actor is motivated. If 
ϕσti = 0, then the player is apathetic. If ϕσti < 0, then MOT is negative, and it indicates 
the disincentive/discouragement (de-motivation) of the actor. 
We point out that MOT is dependent on ϕcti
 and ϕr(s-1)ti
, the payment that an 
actor received and the one that he is considering receiving depending on the effort and 
willingness that he is keen to be engaged in. We note that if ϕσti = 0, then there is no 
reason for an actor to increase his effort or willingness for these coefficients will not 
change his motivation coefficient. However, we realize that if an actor increases eff.ti and 
wti, he will expect ϕσti > 0. If the player increased eff.ti and wti, but ϕσti < 1, then the 
actor not only that would be de-motivated, but also his demotivation would be 
proportionate to the effort and willingness that he had.  
Moreover, we specify that there are different levels of players’ effort and 
willingness. We also note that an actor’s levels may not necessarily be equivalent with 
those of another actor (ex. t2a may consider an effort/willingness of 2, while t2b would 
consider an effort/willingness of 3 for the performance of the same task). For simplicity 
reasons, we will consider the effort and willingness levels being applicable to all players 
in the same manner. Table 6 provides the values and the levels breakdown of our 
coefficients.  
Individual as well as team moral are essential. If moral is low, then the players 
would have a tendency to be de-motivated, and MOT would be negative.  
For all these reasons, we believe that our formula (and thus, our understanding) 
for MOT is correct and adequate in representing reality.   
 
TAL 
The time-adaptation-learning term (TAL) [s ⋅ (adati + lti)/(adati ⋅ lti)] represents an 
indicator composed by the ability to adapt, the capacity to learn, and time. Having a time 
component, the term illustrates accurately reality: all individuals need time to adapt and 
to learn. Moreover, the term is negative because time influences negatively the actions of 
a player.64 A simpler version of the term is: 
 
s ⋅ (adati + lti)/(adati ⋅ lti) = (s ⋅ adati)/(adati ⋅ lti) + (s ⋅ lti)/(adati ⋅ lti)   
            = s / lti + s / adati.    (2.6.13) 
 
As lti (adati) increases, the term s / lti (s / adati) decreases. We also note that if the 
learning and adaptation coefficients increase, then the TAL’s65 value will decrease66. 
Thus, for higher values of the two coefficients, time does not play an important role; it is 
                                                 
64
 The time component refers to how many time units a player needs to adapt or to learn. One can set the 
time units to any time period, depending on the game situations and the environment of the game.  
65
 Note that process-action quality is present by itself, as GLOQ. 
66
 See Proof 2 of the Appendix. 
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minimal. However, for small values of lti (adati), this term increases (not only in value, 
but also in importance).  
We can conclude from (2.6.13) that adaptation, as well as learning, are inverse 
proportionate to time. Our conclusion illustrates nature adequately for one can observe 
that high adaptation (or learning) skills require modicum time for the person to adapt (or 
to learn).  
Having [s/(adati ⋅ lti)] (time / process-action quality) is counterintuitive due to the 
fact that we usually calculate the employee’s ‘productivity’ by how many processes he 
can perform in a unit time (# processes / unit time). However, (adati ⋅ lti) (which is 
equivalent to (adati ⋅ lti)(ap.k)) represents the adaptation and learning levels regarding the 
work applied knowledge of the employee.  
We must take in consideration the fact that players’ past experiences influence 
their behavior, and the former can increase adati and lti. Moreover, if an actor is familiar 
(in any way) with the protocols to be learnt, adati and lti will increase furthermore. This 
aspect is part of the intrinsic characteristics of humans (actors in our case): to draw 
necessary connections (and conclusions) regarding similarities between situations. 
However, more research needs to be made regarding past experiences with similar 
situations and their degree of influence on the actors’ behavior. 
 
 
Part 3 
3.1. Statistical data 
 
Table 7 describes different situations where the leader is present (or not present) 
in the direct supervision of the actors. We have the following labels: setting λ1 – the 
leader is present; setting λ2 – the leader is absent; event α1 – SDH met; event α2 – SDH 
not met (by more than 5 minutes); event α3 – time to spare; event α4 – usage of time to 
spare; event α5 – work related communication; event α6 – no-work related 
communication. 
Our data was collected over a 100 non-consecutive day span where the leader was 
present and supervised directly the players and their work (50 non-consecutive days), and 
where the leader was not present (50 non-consecutive days) while the players were 
engaged in their roles and duties.  
The manner in which the leader gathered the data was: 1) present – close contact 
with his direct reports67; 2) not present – the leader observed from a distance.  
The SDH are applicable only to the imaging team. Moreover, we point out that 
each BU (documents for that specific BU) has its own SDH. Therefore, the SDH does not 
apply to the overall volumes, but to the specialized processes in Imaging. There were two 
(2) SDH shifts (shift 1: 8.30-10.30; shift 2: 10.30-12.30), for a total of 4 hours duration. 
                                                 
67
 The leader helped the players in their duties. We believe that our data is correct due to the fact that for 
more than 80% of the time, one member of the team was absent, thus the leader replaced the missing 
member. We note that the leader is familiar with all the processes that his direct reports are responsible for. 
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Meeting the SDH refers to all processes (P1 to P4) being completed in each of the SDH 
shift for all BUs.  On the occasions when the SDHs were not met, it was due to increase 
of volumes, machinery break-down or mistakes of the players (i.e., the players were not 
proficient in their tasks).  
We point out that missed SDHs have important consequences for the good 
operation of the department and especially, work implications for the BUs that ASU 
services.  
Time to spare (calculated in minutes, ‘m.’) refers to how much time the actors had 
before their SDH shift was over, yet they had finished all processes (P1 to P4). We also 
looked at how this time was utilized by the actors. 
Communication (Com.) was measured by how many communicative interactions 
the players had. We make the distinction between work related communication (strategic 
level) and no-work related communication (social level). The communication interactions 
refer to how many times actors respond to a specific subject.68  
Moreover, we also analyzed different scenarios. Our statistical data (9 situations 
out of a total of 11) shows that if negative payoffs persist for a period of five (5) 
continuous payments, the leader looks ineffective. If this is the case, the leader gets 
challenged both by actors and by the leader’s direct manager.  
 
 
3.1.1. Interpretation of statistical data 
 
Event α2’s percentages refer to the 11% of the SDH not met when the leader was 
present (setting λ1), and to the 19% of the SDH not met when the leader was not present 
(setting λ2). 
We note that when the leader is present, the SDHs are met with a higher 
percentage than in the cases when he is absent (a difference of 8%). Moreover, the 
percentage of α2λ2 is more than double than that of α2λ1.  
Observing event α3, we see an average time that is almost double when the leader 
was present in comparison with λ2 setting. Finishing faster, certain actors can help other 
teams (and members) in their duties, thus reducing the latter’s work load.69 
Beside the work responsibilities, the players have certain administrative duties as 
well. We note that 5% of time to spare (in setting λ1) was used for administrative 
purposes (i.e., team meetings, team building exercises, cleaning, reorganizing, etc.). 
Having ‘spare-time’ at disposal, accomplishing the former does not impact the daily 
operations, thus affecting negatively the SDHs. 
We also note a 23% difference for work related interactions depending on the 
leader’s presence. This could be explained by the fact that the actors do not want to look 
incompetent in front of the leader. Thus, they make ‘judgment calls’ when dealing with 
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 There may be only 1 subject, but 25 interactions between the players.  
69
 It is this aspect that is considered by members for side payments from other members, i.e., Σ
tni∈Tnx
(ϕtni), 
and respectively Σ
tni∉Tnx
(ϕtni). 
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difficult documents (or when they need assistance). We point out that their decisions 
could be wrong. However, we did not monitor how many problems were present 
(problems that were reported by other BUs) during the time we performed our research. 
The latter information could provide additional insight in the understanding of our 
environment. 
We see an important decrease in the number of communication interactions (no-
work related) when the leader was present. Analyzing the fact that talking and working in 
the same time increases the time required for the preparation of documents, we believe 
that we have a lower α2λ1 percentage due to the decrease in time of communication. 
Moreover, this resulted also in actors finishing faster, thus helping others in their duties.  
The reasons for the difference in event α3 refer to the power of the leader 
(position/function wise) manifested by externalities to our game. The players do not wish 
to be observed by the leader for more than one reason. One of them is that there are 1:1 
(leader:direct report) monthly meetings where the leader can address certain issues that 
he observes in the player’s communication or attitude with others. The players do not 
want to provide the leader with too much personal information.  
We note that interactions between members are important for the well being of 
the actors, of the teams, and of the entire department. We specify that no-work related 
communication between actors is essential in order to have a relax and pleasant 
atmosphere. However, the leader must be able to balance a good working environment 
having a good social atmosphere as well as a good productivity. 
To have a general characterization, when the leader is present, the players have a 
semi-controlled behavior due to the fact that at the end of the day, the players still want to 
be a member of the SC.70   
We conclude, based on the statistical evidence, that the leader’s presence has a 
direct impact on the work that his teams perform in all aspects that we analyzed. 
However, we note that if the former setting (λ1) becomes a habit, it could result in the 
deterioration of the work atmosphere because the actors have the impression (and 
sometimes rightfully so) that they are watched; a feeling that is translated in their distrust 
towards the leader. 
Moreover, we observed throughout our research that after a maximum of a two 
(2) week period, the non-adaptive behavior fades out completely. Thus, NAbi drops to 0. 
As stated before, the leader is responsible of choosing appropriate individuals that are 
able to adapt quickly to the team, and that the team incorporates them fast. If NAbi 
continues after one week period (there is no change, i.e., NAbis-5 ≡ NAbis), then the 
leader must address the situation with his new employee.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
70
 Moreover, there are different (possible) payments provided by the leader to the player that the latter want 
to receive (salary increase, end-of-year bonus, promotion, individual recognition, etc.). The players want to 
maximize their chances of receiving the additional payoffs. 
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3.2. Situations estimations 
3.2.1. Payoffs situations  
 
A) Normal day – No deviation – No side payments 
Let us assume a normal payoff situation, where a player performs his duties, 
having the following payoff structure (Tϕλ, ϕλ) = (3, 5)71. We note that in this structure, 
the player does not receive side payments from members of his team or members of other 
teams. Table 8 shows the amount of the payoff for members of different teams. 
We realize that any side payment from other members (of the same team or 
different team(s)) will increase the payoff that the player receives. 
The maximum payment that a player can receive (under the conditions where 
there are no side payments and the maximum payment is given to the teams) is the 
following: for players belonging to T1 and T3 a payment of 21, and for players belonging 
to T2, a payment of 16.2. If side payments are present, ϕi will increase. 
 
B) Normal day – Deviation – No side payments 
Based on (2.3.3) and the fact that there are no side-payments from other members, 
the deviation payoff will be that of the deviation payment provided by the leader. If 
however, deviation side payments are present, the value of δϕi will decrease.    
 
We note that the players will always strive to increase their payoffs. In the context 
of our model, the actors have four such opportunities: 1) ability to handle difficult 
situations (which are dependent on the presence of out-of-the-ordinary situations); 2) side 
payments from other members, thus helping other members; 3) increase the effort 
coefficient; 4) increase the willingness coefficient.     
 
 
3.2.2. The Core 
 
We use the following definition for the core of a game: 
 
Definition 2: The utility vector piti, ..., piT is in the core of the game if it satisfies 
 
pi(T) = u(T), and for ∀C we have pi(C) ≥ u(C), 
 
where T is the set of players, having as subsets/coalitions C ⊆ T, u(C) is 
the characteristic function that specifies the value created by any subset of 
players in T. 
 
The core, the set of un-dominated strategies, is the most utilized solution concept 
in cooperative game theory. From GT perspective, having an empty-core game, therefore 
the absence of the core, signifies that there are no stable coalitions.  
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 We will assume a uniform action combination and we will use the structure (Tϕλ, ϕλ) = (3, 5) as a 
normal day payoff.   
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In section 2.4, we refer to uT* as the value of a coalition T. It is our understanding 
that in the GT format, the value of a coalition and the payoff provided to the coalition are 
analogous. However, we believe that these two concepts should not be the equivalent. 
We make a great distinction (and a great contribution to cooperative literature) by 
specifying that the value of the coalition does not refer only to the payoff to the specific 
coalition.72 GT analyzes the payoff(s) of the team, the members’ portion of the team’s 
payoff, thus what the player gains being (or becoming) a member of the coalition versus 
what he can achieve by himself (as a non-member of that coalition), as a singleton, or 
part of another coalition.  
In order to distinguish between the GT term of value of the coalition (uT, uC, 
uT*) and our understanding of the term, we will refer to the latter as the Coalition Factor 
Estimation (CFE) that is denoted by ûT*.  
We make a further distinction between CFE and the payoff to a coalition. A 
coalition should be considered as a (collective) unit for it has a life of its own. Therefore, 
the payment of the coalition cannot be split between the members of the coalition (an 
aspect that is common in cooperative literature) because it is not the members that receive 
the payoff, but the coalition itself.73  
CFE comprises all elements and features of the coalition’s contribution, and it is 
determined by different aspects that conventional cooperative literature does not take in 
consideration except as special games (where most of the time these components are 
introduces as externalities): payment of the coalition (as a coalition); payment to the 
members of the coalition (as members of the coalition and as individuals); the value that 
the coalition brings to its environment; value of the output of the coalition, etc. All these 
ConCs form an estimation factor.  
We also have the following assumptions: 
 
Assumption 1: As CFE increases, the area of the core (if any) will increase.74 
Assumption 2: As CFE decreases, the area of the core (if any) will decrease. 
 
We also provide a mechanism that provides a specific members’ coalition weight, 
depending on the size of the coalition, thus depending on their overall contribution to 
their team. This is measured by the term [ni/(ni – 1)] that multiplies Tϕλ. We note that in 
our game set-up (Table 8) the players of T1 and T3 receive a higher payoff in comparison 
with the players of T2 due to the size of the coalition.     
Moreover, based on Definition 2, the core concept cannot apply in our game set-
up at L1 due to the fact that the coalitions are not formed by the will of the members. The 
leader appoints the members to a specific coalition. Moreover, members cannot change 
their coalition once they are assigned to one. Thus, being dictatorial in the assignment of 
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 In some situations and certain games, the payoff is split between the members of the coalition. 
73
 The following is an example of GT split payoff: having N = {x, y, z} with a coalition (x, y) that 
maintains v {(x, y), (z)} = (1, 0), and assuming that x and y split equally the payment, we have (x, y, z) = 
(½, ½, 0). 
74
 We will use the following format v(AC)gx when referring to the value of the core’s area for a specific 
game. 
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the teams, we hinder the usage of the core concept. At L1, there is no bargaining set; 
therefore, there is no grand coalition in our game.  
 
Game 1 
Let us analyze a game at L0 level, where the payoff is the same for all players 
(thus assuming that it is a normal day), and we have a uniform action combination. 
Having T1, T2, and T3, we note that u{(T1), (T2), (T3)} = 0 = {∅}. The reason behind 
this assumption is that all three teams work in a supply chain environment where a team 
is dependent on the (work of the) previous team. Taken individually, out of context, 
neither team can exist. Moreover, u{(T1, T2, T3)} = 3 = Tϕλ. 
As it is the nature of any environment in a supply chain context, a node is 
dependent on its previous node. Also, this dependence decreases as the distance between 
the nodes increases. We have the following values of the possible coalitions:  
 
u (T1, T2) = Tϕλ ¾ = 9/4;    u (T1, T3) = Tϕλ ½ = 3/2; 
u (T2, T3) = Tϕλ ¾ = 9/4. 
 
where ¾ and ½ represent the dependence coefficients between two adjacent nodes and 
between two nodes that are not consecutive, respectively.75  
 
The imputation (T1, T2, T3) is the core of the game if: 
 
T1 + T2 ≥ u (T1, T2) = 9/4  iff T3 ≤ 3/4; 
T1 + T3 ≥ u (T1, T3) = 3/2  iff T2 ≤ 5/2; 
T2 + T3 ≥ u (T2, T3) = 9/4  iff T1 ≤ 3/4. 
 
   We can also find all pairs of the core using Figure 2. The core, having Tϕλ = 3 at 
L0, is defined by the pentagon with the vertices [(0.75, 2.25, 0), (0.5, 2.5, 0), (0, 2.5, 0.5), 
(0, 2.25, 0.75), (0.75, 1.5, 0.75)]. Every pair in this pentagon is not dominated by any 
other pair in the inside of the (T1, T2, T3) triangle and the outside of the core pentagon. 
Moreover, the core in Game 1 has a total area value of 0.438. 
 
Game 2 
Let us analyze the same game characterized by a uniform action combination, 
however using the CFE as substitute to the value of the coalition. We represent the values 
of the CFE in the following form: 
 
Tn  {(adati, lti, βti, βTni, βti(Tni), ϕcti, ϕr(s-1)ti, eff.ti, wti, s) ⇒ 
⇒ (GLOQ, OBR, ϕσti, MOT, TAL)} = v (ai:ti) (3.2.2.1) 
 
Therefore, we have: 
                                                 
75
 We will use the same dependence coefficients in all the games that we will study. 
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T1 ≡ T3  {(3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 11, 11, 3, 3, 1) ⇒  
⇒ (9, 20, 0, 0, 0.667) = 28.333    (3.2.2.2) 
T2  {(3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 8.6, 8.6, 3, 3, 1) ⇒  
⇒ (9, 20, 0, 0, 0.667) = 28.333   (3.2.2.3) 
 
(3.2.2.2) and (3.2.2.3) provide us with the exact calculation of the CFE for each team: 
 
Σai:ti =  ûT1 = ûT3 = 56.666  Σai:ti =  ûT2 = 169.998 
 
which creates the overall value û(G2) = û {(T1, T2, T3)} = 283.33. 
Using the same rational and providing the same node distance-influence values, 
we have: 
 
û (T1, T2) = (56.666 + 169.998) ⋅ ¾ =  169.998;  
û (T1, T3) = (56.666 +56.666) ⋅ ½ = 56.666;  
û (T2, T3) = (169.998 + 56.666) ⋅ ¾ = 169.998. 
 
The imputation (T1, T2, T3) is the core of the game if 
 
T1 + T2 ≥ û (T1, T2) = 169.998 iff T3 ≤ 56.666; 
T1 + T3 ≥ û (T1, T3) = 56.666 iff T2 ≤ 169.998; 
T2 + T3 ≥ û (T2, T3) = 169.998 iff T1 ≤ 56.666. 
    
We realize that the values can be factored (1ü = 56.666), thus creating a unit of 
56.666. This provides us with: 
 
T1 + T2 ≥ 3 iff T3 ≤ 2;   T1 + T3 ≥ 1 iff T2 ≤ 4; 
T2 + T3 ≥ 3 iff T1 ≤ 2. 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the core of our game. The core is the pentagon that has the 
vertices [(2, 3, 0), (1, 4, 0), (0, 4, 1), (0, 3, 2), (2, 1, 2)]. Every pair in this pentagon is not 
dominated by any other pair in the inside of the (T1, T2, T3) triangle and the outside of 
the core pentagon. 
We notice that the use of the CFE increased the core. The core in Game 2 has an 
area of 3.5ü2. Thus, the total value of the area of the core is 198.331. 
One may argue that Game 2 has a coalition value of 5 in comparison with Game 1 
that has a value of 3, and this would be the reason why v(AC)g2 > v(AC)g1. However, we 
point out that in Game 1, the value of the coalition is ‘equally’ split between the teams 
(also taking in consideration the node distance effect). In the previous statement, we have 
the following assumption: 
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Assumption 3: In Game 1, the three teams contributed equally to the value of the total 
coalition.  
 
Using the CFE, we notice that this is not the case. T1 and T3 contributed equally 
to û(G2), whereas T2 contributed more than T1 and T3 (individually).  
 
Game 3 
We notice that the MOT term was not present in ûG2. MOT might affect the core 
by influencing the CFE. Moreover, taking in consideration Assumption 1, there is a 
possibility that by amplifying the CFE, then the core of the game (using CFE) increases. 
Let us analyze the following game (where we still have a uniform action combination), 
having the same form as in (3.2.2.1): 
 
T1 ≡ T3  {(3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 12, 11, 4, 4, 1) ⇒  
⇒ (9, 20, 1, 8, 0.667) = 36.333   (3.2.2.4) 
T2  {(3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 9.6, 8.6, 4, 4, 1) ⇒  
⇒ (9, 20, 1, 8, 0.667) = 36.333   (3.2.2.5) 
 
We notice that eff.ti and wti have increased to an above average level, thus also increasing 
ϕσti to 1. Therefore, we have: 
 
Σai:ti =  ûT1 = ûT3 = 72.667  Σai:ti =  ûT2 = 217.998 
 
which creates the overall value û(G3) = û {(T1, T2, T3)} = 363.332, where 
 
û (T1, T2) = (72.667 + 217.998) ⋅ ¾ = 217.998;  
û (T1, T3) = (72.667 + 72.667) ⋅ ½ = 72.667; 
û (T2, T3) = (217.998+ 72.667) ⋅ ¾ = 217.998. 
 
The imputation (T1, T2, T3) is the core of the game if 
 
T1 + T2 ≥ û (T1, T2) = 217.998  iff T3 ≤ 145.334; 
T1 + T3 ≥ û (T1, T3) = 72. 667   iff T2 ≤ 290.665; 
T2 + T3 ≥ û (T2, T3) = 217.998  iff T1 ≤ 145.334. 
 
   We realize that the values can be factored (1ü = 72.667), thus creating a unit of 
72.667. This provides us with: 
 
T1 + T2 ≥ 3 iff T3 ≤ 2;   T1 + T3 ≥ 1 iff T2 ≤ 4; 
T2 + T3 ≥ 3 iff T1 ≤ 2. 
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Figure 4 illustrates the core of this game. The core is the triangle that has the 
vertices [(2, 3, 0), (1, 4, 0), (0, 4, 1), (0, 3, 2), (2, 1, 2)]. Every pair in this triangle is not 
dominated by any other pair in the inside of the (T1, T2, T3) triangle and the outside of 
the core pentagon. 
The core in Game 3 has an area of 3.5ü2, which give us a total value of the core’s 
area of 254.335. We notice that  
 
v(AC)g3 > v(AC)g2,       (3.2.2.6) 
  
which confirms Assumption 1. Moreover, we notice that the core pentagon in Game 2 has 
the same vertices as the core pentagon of Game 3. However, ü is not the same in the two 
games. 
 
Game 4 
Let us analyze a game where we still have a uniform action combination, 
however, it is characterized by a weak cooperation, negative payoff stimulation, thus a 
negative motivation for the players, minimal effort and willingness. The game has the 
following form: 
 
T1 ≡ T3  {(3, 3, 1, 1, 1, 10, 11, 2, 2, 1) ⇒  
⇒ (9, 5, -1, -0.25, 0.667) = 13.083   (3.2.2.7) 
T2  {(3, 3, 1, 1, 1, 7.6, 8.6, 2, 2, 1) ⇒  
⇒ (9, 5, -1, -0.25, 0.667) = 13.083   (3.2.2.8) 
 
Therefore, we have: 
 
Σai:ti =  ûT1 = ûT3 = 26.167  Σai:ti =  ûT2 = 78.5 
 
which creates the overall value û(G4) = û {(T1, T2, T3)} = 130.834, where 
 
û (T1, T2) = (26.167+ 78.5) ⋅ ¾ = 78.5;  
û (T1, T3) = (26.167+ 26.167) ⋅ ½ = 26.167; 
û (T2, T3) = (78.5 + 26.167) ⋅ ¾ = 78.5. 
 
The imputation (T1, T2, T3) is the core of the game if 
 
T1 + T2 ≥ û (T1, T2) = 78.5  iff T3 ≤ 52.334; 
T1 + T3 ≥ û (T1, T3) = 26.167 iff T2 ≤ 104.667; 
T2 + T3 ≥ û (T2, T3) = 78.5   iff T1 ≤ 52.334. 
 
   We realize that the values can be factored (1ü = 26.167), thus creating a unit of 
26.167. This provides us with: 
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T1 + T2 ≥ 3 iff T3 ≤ 2;   T1 + T3 ≥ 1 iff T2 ≤ 4; 
T2 + T3 ≥ 3 iff T1 ≤ 2. 
 
Figure 5 illustrates the core of this particular game. The core is the triangle that 
has the vertices [(2, 3, 0), (1, 4, 0), (0, 4, 1), (0, 3, 2), (2, 1, 2)]. Every pair in this triangle 
is not dominated by any other pair in the inside of the (T1, T2, T3) triangle and the 
outside of the core pentagon. 
The core in Game 4 has an area of 3.5ü2, which give us a total value of the area of 
the core equal to 91.585.  We notice that  
 
v(AC)g2 > v(AC)g4,       (3.2.2.9) 
 
which confirms Assumption 2.  
 
Game 5 
Let us analyze a game76 that is more complex, where we do not have a uniform 
action combination. Table 9 provides all the values of our game. Moreover, we point out 
that t2a is not present in our table. This is due to the fact that t2a is absent, not present at 
work.  
We have an overall value û(G5) = û {(T1, T2, T3)} = 527.13, where 
 
û (T1, T2) = (476.464) ⋅ ¾ = 357.348;  
û (T1, T3) = (110.964) ⋅ ½ = 55.482; 
û (T2, T3) = (466.832) ⋅ ¾ = 350.124. 
 
 The imputation (T1, T2, T3) is the core of the game if 
 
T1 + T2 ≥ û (T1, T2) = 357.348  iff T3 ≤ 169.782;  
T1 + T3 ≥ û (T1, T3) = 55.482  iff T2 ≤ 471.648; 
T2 + T3 ≥ û (T2, T3) = 350.124  iff T1 ≤ 177.006. 
 
Figure 6 illustrates the core of our game. The core is the pentagon that has the 
vertices [(177.006, 350.124, 0), (55.482, 471.648, 0), (0, 471.648, 55.482), (0, 357.348, 
169.782), (177.006, 180.342, 169.782)]. Every pair in this pentagon is not dominated by 
any other pair in the inside of the (T1, T2, T3) triangle and the outside of the core 
pentagon. Moreover, the total value of the area of the core is 28719.506. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
76
 We note that this game models a real life situation. All the previous theoretical games provided us with a 
framework for the understanding of our environment. We will try to compare the theoretical findings with a 
real life situation, and understand the differences (if any) between them. 
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Data for Game 5 
Variables Values 
Players t1a t1b t2b t2c t2d t2e t2f t3a t3b 
ni 2 2 5 5 5 5 5 2 2 
(ni – 1) 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 1 1 
Tϕλ 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 
ϕλ 6 5 2 5 4 6 5 4 6 
δ 0 0 -2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
c1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 
Σ
tni∈Tnx
(ϕtni) 2 0 -1 0 0 2 1 0 1 
c2 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 
Σ
tni∉Tnx
(ϕtni) 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
ϕr(s-1)ti
 
18 13 4 10 9 15 12 8 11 
adati 3 2 2 3 2 3 2 1.5 3 
lti 4 3.5 2 3 3 3 3 2 4 
βti 4 4 -3 4 1 6 4 4 1 
βTni 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
βti(Tni) 4 4 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 
ϕcti
 
19 12 6 11 11 16 14 8 12 
eff.ti 4 1 4 4 4 3 4 3 4 
wti 3 2 4 3 3 5 2 2 3 
s 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 
GLOQ 12 7 4 9 6 9 6 3 12 
OBR 20 16 3 20 13 22 16 14 17 
ϕσti 1 -1 2 1 2 1 2 0 1 
MOT 7 -0.333 128 7 98 8 72 0 7 
TAL 0.583 0.786 1 0.667 1.667 0.667 0.833 1.167 1.167 
Total 
value 38.417 21.881 134.000 35.333 115.333 38.333 93.167 15.833 34.833 
ûT 60.298 416.166 50.666 
ûT1 ûT2 ûT3 
Table 9 
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Interpretation of results 
We note that û(G5) is calculated for an entire SDH period. Thus, s = 1 SDH = 120 
minutes. All the actions of one player are considered for this specific time unit. We can 
ilustrate this by the following : 
 
Σai:ti∈T =  ai:ti∈T
(s=1SDH)
    
 
Σai:ti∈T
(s=1SDH)
 = ûTti 
 
We notice that û(G5) > [û(G2), û(G3), û(G4)] individually. The reason for this 
high value is the contribution of three players (t2b, t2d, t2f) belonging to T2. 
We observe that the three players have a very high MOT. In our case, the high 
MOT is characterized by a high payoff stimulation (ϕσti = 2). Having a high MOT, and 
thus having a substantial contribution to ûT2, we remarked that the three players created a 
suitable work atmosphere (which was characterized by their willingness (or effort) to 
increase their payoffs). Moreover, the players were more involved and focused in the 
accomplishment of their duties and, in the same time, they helped other members.  
In addition, t2b is the most interesting player to analyze. He is a deviator, yet he 
has the strongest contribution to ûT2. We point out that the leader provided him with a 
deviation payment of -2, and his own team provided a deviation payment of -1. 
Moreover, he has a normal non-cooperation behavior (a value of -3). His team did not 
want him (at this stage)77 to have the same team behavior value (of normal cooperation – 
a value of 4), but just to minimaly cooperate, having a value of 1.  
Even though there were negative components that contributed to t2b’s lower 
payoff (ϕr(s-1)t2b = 4, which is the lowest of all the players), as well to a lower OBR, it is 
the payoff stimulation (ϕσti) that makes the greatest difference.  
We have some conclusions drawn from this example : 
- the player’s previous payoff (ϕr(s-1)ti) is important as much as it is taken in 
consideration with the desired player’s payoff (ϕcti), thus creating the payoff 
stimulation; 
- even though GLOQ, OBR, TAL have some influence on the value added by a 
player, they are not the most important elements if ϕσti ≥ 2; 
- If ϕσti ≥ 2, then MOT becomes the most important term in ai:tx; 
- Having a strong positive MOT (and we believe it is the case for a strong 
negative MOT as well), it influences the atmosphere of the team; 
- If a player has a strong positive MOT, then he will be more focused in the 
accomplishment of his duties; 
                                                 
77
 It is better to demand from a player small incremental changes – may those be operational or behavioral. 
Demanding a higher requirement from an individual might result in a strong resistance to the demand.  
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- If a player has a strong positive MOT, then he will be more willing to help 
other members, thus increase their payoffs. 
 
We specify that this game is a snapshot in time and space (Popp, 2002) where it 
refers only to one specific instance (in space and time). It does not take in consideration 
the full extent of what happened in the previous period or what will happen in the next 
one. Our (game-) environment evolves and is dependent on what happens in s-1. It would 
be interesting to analyze a continuum of periods that are sequential, having the same 
structure.   
 
 
3.2.3. OVERALL UNDERSTANDING OF THE GAMES 
 
We clarify that βti is the behavior of the player at the beginning of his action. 
During the course of the action, his behavior can change. This is how t2b started having a 
normal non-cooperative behavior, but still helped other members. His performance would 
be reflected in the next period (where we would have a cooperation behavior, an increase 
of his payoff, etc.).  
We have noted in section 2.6. (OBR) that cooperative and non-cooperative 
behaviors are mutually exclusive when an actor is engaged in a specific action. However, 
an actor changed his behavior during the same action (period) in Game 5. We note that in 
this specific game, we have a Σai:ti∈T
(s=1SDH)
, which represents all the actions that the 
actors were engaged in for a period of 120 minutes. Within this ‘long’ period of time that 
we analyzed, we note that there were many different actions in which the players were 
involved in.  
We still maintain that a player cannot have conflicting behaviors during the 
course of the same action. However, we point out that the behavior of the player can 
change if the period analyzed is long – situation that arrived in Game 5.  
In all the games that we analyzed, we have the presence of the total core. We 
believe that this is normal in a supply chain environment, due to the nature of the NC’s 
output that is a common service (or product) where different teams handle sequential 
processes. 
However, we point out that the domain of the core is larger when using the CFE 
in comparison with the first game in which we used the value of the coalition. Actors 
have different methods (and circumstance available) to form the total core using the CFE, 
û(C). Regarding this aspect, the value of the coalition u(C) has only limited 
interpretations and representations, and it does not properly illustrate reality. 
Having a greater core area (v(AC)) the teams (and especially certain members of 
the team(s)) have the possibility to adapt to new situations (having dynamic interactions). 
Moreover, some members of a team can compensate for a lower ai:tx value (of other 
members) in order either to maintain the total core or to increase it. 
If the players have a MOT of 1 or -1, then they require side payments from other 
members in order to increase their added value and thus, the ûT*. Moreover, we note that 
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if we have ϕσti ≥ 2 in one period for one actor, and the latter does not receive the desired 
payoff, then he might be de-motivated in the following period.  
In Game 5, we notice that ûT2 greatly dominates those of the other teams. We 
also point out that T2 has more players in comparison with the other teams. This can play 
to its advantage (as in Game 5), or to its disadvantage (if for example, the players are 
demotivated, therefore ûTn would be negative). 
A possible approach for the understanding of such situations would be to have a 
common average contribution (the average contribution of the players, denoted by đ) for 
the teams. This is represented by  
 
đTn = (ûTn)/ntni ∈ Tn.       (3.2.3.1) 
 
In the context of Game 5, we would have 
 
đT1 = 60.298 / 2 = 30.149;    đT2 = 416.166 / 5 = 83.233; 
đT3 = 50.666 / 2 = 25.333. 
 
This is translated to: on average, T2 players contributed more to the CFE than the 
players of the other teams; and, T1 players contributed more to the CFE than the players 
of T3. Moreover, we notice that đT2 has a more than double value than those of the other 
teams. 
Using this method, a modeler can compare the average contributions of players 
belonging to different teams. Moreover, a different approach would be to have a common 
average contribution of each player, independently of the team to which he is a member 
of, an approach that does not take in consideration the fact that different teams contribute 
differently (different amounts) to ûT. This is represented by: 
  
ĐT = (ûTn)/n.        (3.2.3.2) 
 
In the context of Game 5, we would have  
 
ĐT = 527.13 / 9 = 58.57. 
 
Even if these methods (described in (3.2.3.1) and (3.2.3.2)) do provide some 
insight into the matter (and a lot of statistical and inference analysis can be performed), 
they can create other problematic (and questionable) situations where different biases 
might be present.  
Based on the four CFE games that we analyzed, we can conclude that Assumption 
1 is accurate. Moreover, taking the previous statement in consideration as well as the fact 
that Assumption 1 is directly linked with Assumption 2 (being opposite to it), we 
stipulate that the latter is also accurate. Thus, the value of the CFE does influence the area 
of the core (ûTn ╬ v(AC)).  
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We observe that T2 in Game 5 has the most members and is sided by two teams 
that have less members (i.e., T1 = T3 = 2). Moreover, we notice that in all the games that 
we analyzed, ûT2 dominates those of the other teams. Dominating the other teams, and 
also being the middle node, ûT2 greatly influences the v(AC).78  
We note that in the three team supply chain environment that we studied, 
Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 may not hold, if the team that provides the greatest ûTn 
is the first or last node. Thus, there is a possibility where v(AC) may not be dependent 
only on the CFE, but also on the closeness coefficient between the nodes. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Supply chain environments 
Due to their nature, supply chain environments have a very interesting setup. 
General GT can help in their understanding; however, external elements (from 
psychology, sociology and management) must be employed in order to have an 
appropriate comprehension of the proper management of a supply chain environment 
(SCE).  However, we point out that a specific set of games, stochastic games (or Markov 
games), are widely used in SCE precisely for their applicability in such settings79. Even 
though stochastic games are a more appropriate tool to be utilized in SCM, we note that 
the former still have limitations. 
We have analyzed different aspects related to the environment of a supply 
network. Our games provide a description of a specific setup where the processes are 
representative of a setting that provides both services and public goods. The latter need to 
be offered in a timely manner and at great quality. It is for this reason that we have 
examined the performance of our actors and of the teams that the actors form. The 
manner in which we monitored the activity of our environment was by observing the 
interactions and the productivity of the players on a 100 days non-consecutive span, 
where we analyzed certain reasons for the variations in the productivity of the system. 
We also took note of the institution(al) perspectives that refer to the network’s 
configuration and structure. We have considered different theoretical games, and we 
compared these findings with a game that models the exact setting and environment of 
the actors. Based on our analysis and our inference, we have suggested different courses 
of action that a leader could employ in order to implement different strategies for the 
(improved) fulfillment of the mission of his department.  
 
Characteristics of the game 
Our game setup provides certain constraints, which were introduced only for 
simplicity reasons: a specialized process set (or sub-set) denotes a process that is covered 
only by a specific team; no other team can cover and execute a process which it is not 
specialized in. However, in reality, all our actors are cross-trained on other players’ tasks 
(tasks that are not part of the actors’ daily responsibilities). Thus, players can replace (or 
                                                 
78
 This is also caused by the closeness coefficient between the nodes, i.e. T1- T2: ¾, T1- T3: ½ , T2- T3: ¾. 
79
 See Majumder and Groenevelt (2001) for the analysis of deterministic time-dependent multi-period 
games in reverse logistics supply chains. 
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help) other players belonging to different teams when required (ex. one member absent, 
spike in volumes, etc), situation in which duties and/or tasks are (re)distributed to the 
members present. Taking this aspect in consideration, one can create a more 
comprehensive game in which externalities are introduced such that members of one 
coalition are cross-trained.  
Non-cooperative literature upholds that there must be competition between certain 
(or all) members of a coalition. However, there is no competition between the teams and 
between the members in our environment. The latter is set up in such a way that 
competition is not permitted, and in the same time, the actors (or teams) do not gain 
anything from any type of competition. We point out that in a supply chain environment, 
where everything is connected (and dependent) to a previous node, there cannot be any 
competition present.  
 
Leader 
The leader plays a central role in our NC for he is responsible to plan, to organize, 
to lead, and to control. There are a lot of variables that he has to take in consideration 
when making decisions regarding his direct reports and when trying to maximize the 
functionality of the operations that he is accountable for. In general terms, the leader is 
engaged in continuous planning and forecasting.   
He must cover the functional strategies (the planning of the activities of the ASU) 
in addition to the operation strategies (which refer to the day-to-day tasks, and 
coordinating efforts and resources). His ability to foresee any change(s) that would affect 
his environment is as important as his ability to adapt to the change(s). Therefore, he 
must modify his supervisory styles in order to adjust to the different situations (external 
or internal to the ASU). 
We also note that the leader pays close attention to continuous improvements both 
for his direct reports as well as for the operations that he is responsible for. These 
enhancements must follow the same trend as the corporate culture of the company.  
The leader must analyze on a regular basis the productivity of his direct reports by 
benchmark exercises, in addition to the situational system by conducting different types 
of investigation (ex. SWOT). However, we caution that just gathering the data and 
analyzing it is not enough. The leader should implement the findings as much as he can. 
Combining these results, all the players involved (including the leader, the department, as 
well as the company as a whole) will have everything to gain. There would be an 
appropriate work atmosphere where moral would be high.  
People are complex and their needs change over time. There are different 
conditions (socio-cultural, technological, gender, age, etc.) which determine the dynamics 
and complexity of the department’s environment. The leader must be aware of these 
conditions and he must always take them in consideration. 
To summarize, the leader must accomplish organizational objectives and he must 
verify that his direct reports meet them also. He should have close interactions with his 
employees in order for him to know their needs (and to be supportive of them), to build 
good working relations, and create a climate that is prone for productivity, yet keep a 
relax atmosphere. 
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Payoffs 
We point out that team payoffs represent a public good. Team payments are paid 
to the team and they should not (and most of the time they are not) be split between the 
members of that team. It is the team (the unit) that receives those payments. Moreover, 
we point out that players do receive individual payments, which provides a mechanism 
(incorporated in our game in the CFE) to safeguard against the split of the team’s payoffs. 
In a team environment, we believe that direct payments to the members of the 
team(s) as well as payments to the team(s) are equal in importance. 
 
Coalition 
In our system, an agent disposes of a very short time to adapt to the coalition that 
he is assigned to. In case that he does not adapt, he will become a non-member of the 
coalition (a singleton). Thus, it is very important that the leader appoints the appropriate 
individuals to the appropriate coalition. 
Besides the negative payoffs that the leader (or other members) has the ability to 
inflict on actors that do not follow the ASU culture, there are other mechanisms that can 
be implemented in order to deter members from deviation: 
 
1. increased communication – through communication, there is interaction; the 
teams know beforehand what is happening and what is expected of them; 
2. team building exercises (having as end result the fact that actors increase their 
trust of other members; members have a different setting in which they interact, 
thus learning more about each other and about themselves as teams); 
3. team recognition programs (leader recognizes good work of the members acting 
as a collective unit and of the team);  
4. individual recognition (either the leader or another individual recognize a specific 
actor for a job well done). 
 
We have noted that an actor has a direct impact on the productivity and 
performance of all other members (or teams) in our network. This results in a direct 
influence of one member on the success and affluence of the entire system. In a SCE, not 
only that all actors should be aware of this characteristic, but they should also understand 
the consequences of their actions.  
 
Behavior 
We make the distinction between environmental behavior, the behavior that an 
actor has at the work place, and the personal behavior, which represents the state of mind 
of the actor. The leader must determine (as soon as possible) the intrinsic behavior in 
which the actor is engaged in.  
Moreover, we note that behavior is dynamic80 and it depends on many elements. 
The leader (or a modeler) has only partial control over some of these components. In our 
case, the leader can impose certain behavior characteristics from the members and from 
the teams (i.e., cooperation). However, this does not entail that the actors will actually 
behave in the manner that the leader desires. A modeler must take this aspect in 
                                                 
80
 See Popp, 2006a, 2009. 
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consideration when developing a game that tries to comprehend the effects of behavior 
on the actions of the players.  
If the NAbi is the intrinsic behavior of the player, then that player will not be able 
to adapt to the work environment, to the members and to the different teams. In order not 
to affect negatively the atmosphere and the moral of the players, it is better to take that 
player out of the game. Thus, the leader will terminate that player’s contract.  
We also note that a player can change his behavior during the course of an action. 
The player can have a cooperative (or uncooperative) behavior at the beginning of the 
action, and at the end of the action to have an uncooperative (or cooperative) behavior. 
However, we point out that his performance would be reflected appropriately in his next 
payoff (information that the player is aware of). 
 
Actions 
Our formula for the value of actors’ actions (and the value that is created) is quite 
complex. We realize that there are many elements that are taken in consideration. 
However, we require all these variables in order to build a comprehensive model for the 
interactions of players in a supply chain environment and the consequences of these 
interactions.  
Furthermore, we point out that beliefs are imbedded in all terms related to the 
actor (adati, lti, βti, βTni, ϕσti, eff.ti, wti). Beliefs correspond to certain precepts, elements 
or situations of reality. They are derived from certain evidence or information. This 
process requires time in order for beliefs to consolidate. 
It must be pointed out that when referring to a belief, there are two aspects: 
 
1. the subject (the actor who is engaged in believing); 
2. the object (the ConC that the specific belief is pointing to).  
 
Models that incorporate beliefs in their operationalization must look at both these aspects. 
We note that multitasking is not taken in consideration in ai:ti. In reality, 
multitasking is an important quality and attribute that all the members of the ASU must 
have. Being cross-trained on different tasks, actors can alternate between processes (and 
duties) depending on their priorities.  
We note that if multitasking is allowed in our game setup, then a modeler must 
permit more then one ai:ti permutation simultaneously. This would change the setup of 
our setting.   
 
Statistical data 
Based on our statistical data, we conclude that the leader’s presence within the 
team increases the productivity of the team. There were different studies (in psychology 
and management) that confirm the same results. However, we point out that even if the 
leader’s presence has a positive impact on the productivity of his direct reports (and thus 
on the output), his presence should not become a habit due to the fact that actors dislike it 
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when they are watched and their work is verified81 on a continuous basis. This aspect 
influences the team moral and the actors’ dignity (because they see the leader doubting 
their ability to do their job properly). 
 
Games 
In our games, there is no bargaining set at L1, thus there is no core at L1. This 
results in the absence of a grand coalition of the members of the ASU. This is due to the 
nature of the environment that we studied (leader dictatorialship regarding the formation 
of teams). However, we note that the core is present at L0, and therefore teams can 
cooperate in order to maintain (or increase) the value added to the system. Business 
coalitions are essential in an environment that is dynamic and where changes are 
introduced periodically. 
We perceived a great difference between the use of the value of the game (uT*) 
and that of the CFE (ûT*). It is our opinion that using the CFE provides a better 
understanding in the reality of team cooperation in a supply chain environment.  
Our game setup provides a stable configuration for the players at L1 because there 
is no reason for a deviation to take place. However, even if a player engages in deviation, 
the other members of the ASU can compensate for the lower ai:tx created (thus covering 
for the deviation in certain instances). However, prolonged deviation will result in the 
removal of that player from the game. As mentioned before, dynamic interactions are 
present (and essential) in our game at many levels and in many forms. 
Moreover, the L0 coalition configuration is optimal for the members of the teams, 
and thus the teams themselves, must work together in order to, not only accomplish a 
specific goal, but also to maximize the manner in which the latter is accomplished (may 
that be faster or better, or both).   
The area of the core (v(AC)) provides us with a clear understanding of the space 
of the core. Using this method of measurement, we can easily compare the cores of 
different games. This is important in the understanding of the same game that is played at 
different points in time. Comparing the v(AC), a modeler can monitor variations within 
the game and pinpoint areas of interest.  
As ûTn1 increases, other coalitions loose their perceived ‘contribution’ (lower 
ûTn+i), and Tn1 becomes the most ‘important’. Other teams (Tn+i) might see this effect in 
a negative way. We note that if this situation continues and becomes customary, the 
moral of the others teams would decrease. 
However, we provide certain safety measures for such situations. If ûTn1 becomes 
dominant, one has the choice to break Tn1 in smaller teams. Another way to deal with it 
is to incorporate the other teams in Tn1. Thus, there would be only one team in the 
department. However, we note that there would be no coalitions to form the total core at 
L0 due to the manner in which the members are assigned to the team (leader’s 
dictatorialship). 
                                                 
81
 We are not referring to the confirmation of the actors’ effort status. Verify in this situation refers to 
constant validation done in an authoritarian manner. 
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We also remark that there was no pessimism in Game 5 for t2b. The state of mind 
of our player was attributed to personal issues. Moreover, the leader did not have to 
address the ‘deviation’ with t2b. The latter’s performance (and attitude) was only 
temporary, and it improved in the following payoff period. This is an example of a 
player’s unwilling deviation. 
We also note that MOT is a very good indicator of the players’ moral, which is 
reflected in the moral of the team. Game 5 demonstrated this aspect very well. 
 
General 
Our (2.6.1) formula has many utilities. Not only that an actor can monitor his own 
progress regarding the input that he has to the system, but also it can help the leader to 
pinpoint problematic situations. It allows the modeler to observe the progress of the 
actors, depending on a specific term (GLOQ, OBR, MOT, TAL), and to isolate 
challenging elements. 
Using the same formula, one can construct numerous situations in order to reflect 
a specific environment either by varying the individual terms or by constructing different 
settings with multiple teams (that vary in the number of their members). This flexibility 
provides the modeler with great input in the situations that he endeavors to study. 
We point out that if low moral is present (within the teams and within a 
department), personnel quits.82 This would result in a high turnover. New players would 
need to be introduced to our system, and the former need to adapt to the latter. Moreover, 
the new employees need to be trained. We acknowledge that there are a lot of resources 
invested in the actors. It is our opinion that it is better to keep moral high and avoid all 
other consequential problematic situations related to the implications of low moral of the 
teams and members of the teams. 
Actors must be effective and efficient – attain the objectives by a high 
productivity and with the least resources wasted. In the same time, teamwork is very 
important and actors must sustain the team of which they are part of. 
We have studied some aspects of the interaction(s) between members of teams in 
an environment that is characterized by the presence of a leader (which holds a position 
of responsibility) that has direct reports (which have operational responsibilities). We 
specify that the latter do not have any direct reports. A very interesting topic of research 
would be to analyze the environment and the interactions between the leader and his 
direct manager. In this game, the two players would have direct reports and have a 
position of power/authority. We believe that the interactions between the two players 
would provide significant and noteworthy results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
82
 This is a valid statement in today’s workplace environment where employees have the ability to choose 
from a wide range of options. 
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Appendix 
Proofs omitted in the main text 
 
Proof 1 
 
Assumption 4:  High levels of adati and lti, meaning (adati ⋅ lti)(ap.k), will result in a high 
quality work.  
 
Proof. By definition, high quality work implies two aspects – efficiency and 
effectiveness: 1. the work is done fast; and 2) the work is done well (proficient).  
In order for the work to be proficient, a player needs specific knowledge to 
perform the tasks at hand. This involves learning abilities. If the player’s learning 
abilities are high, then that player can acquire the specific knowledge more efficiently 
and in a shorter time span (call this Argument 1).  
The adaptation of a player refers to his ability to have three types of reasoning: 
inductive, deductive, and abductive. A high adaptation level represents a high reasoning 
ability (of the three types, and a faster ability to alternate between them depending on the 
situation at hand). The faster this reasoning is, the higher the adaptation level (call this 
Argument 2). 
Argument 1 refers to the fact that if learning (thus, the acquisition of knowledge) 
is faster, then one has a higher learning ability. Argument 2 indicates that if one knows 
what to do faster (he has the knowledge of faster execution), then that actor has a higher 
adaptation ability. 
From Argument 1 and Argument 2 results the following: if one has the knowledge 
and is able to apply it to a specific situation, where less time is required to perform the 
specific duty, then the quality of the work performed by that actor is good.  
Therefore, higher adati and higher lti signify high quality work.  
  
 
We point out that the definitions used in the paper for adati and lti are very limited 
and they reflect only the environment of our game set-up. The true understanding and 
applicability of these terms has great complexity.83  
 
Proof 2 
 
We need to prove that if adati > 1 and lti > 1, then (adati + lti)/(adati ⋅ lti) will 
decrease.  
 
Proof. For simplicity reasons, let us call AL of TAL the term (adati + lti)/(adati ⋅ lti). 
Moreover, let us have x = adati and y = lti. 
 
                                                 
83
 For a small introduction to learning, see Popp (2009). 
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If x > 2, then 1/x < 1/2;  if y > 2, then 1/y < 1/2. 
 
Adding the two inequalities, we have: 
 
1/x +1/y < 1/2 + 1/2. 
 
Having as common denominator xy on the left hand side: 
 
x/xy + y/xy < 1 ≡ 
≡ (x + y)/xy < 1 ≡ 
≡ x + y < xy ≡ 
≡ (adati + lti)/(adati ⋅ lti) < 1. 
  
 
Table 10 provides us with certain values for (adati + lti)/(adati ⋅ lti). Moreover, we 
use the condition that adati = lti when we constructed the values of Table 10. In the same 
time, we specify that x + y < xy is valid only if (x; y) > 2.   
 
 
Tables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legend of symbols used 
Symbol Interpretation 
≈ may 
→ form 
⌠ covers 
 
  
comprehends 
and executes 
╬ influence 
Table 1 
Explanation of teams and processes 
P1A Distribute unopened mail 
P1B Open and separate documents by BU 
P2A Department A (Dep. A) documents 
P2B Department B (Dep. B) documents 
P2C Department C (Dep. C) documents 
P3A Prepping Dep. A documents 
P3B Prepping Dep. B documents 
P3C Prepping Dep. C documents 
P4A Document scanning 
Processes 
P4B Cheques scanning 
T1 Mail team 
T2 Imaging prepping team Teams 
T3 Imaging scanning team 
Table 2 
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Payoff Regulations 
Variable Scale 
Tϕλ [0, 6] 
ϕλ [0, 9] 
c1, c2 [0, 3] 
(ϕtni (tni ∈ Tnx)), (ϕtni(tni ∉ Tnx)) [0, 3] 
δ [-3, 0] 
Table 3 
Values of Learning and 
Adaptation Levels 
Values Level  
0 non existent 
[1, 2) beginner 
[2, 4) normal 
[4, 5] expert 
Table 4 
Behavior Values 
Cooperation 6 4 1 
Non-cooperation -4 -3 -1 
V
alu
e
 
Level Strong Normal  Weak  
 
Table 5 
Effort and Willingness 
Values and Levels 
Values Level of effort and 
willingness 
0 Non existent 
1 Negligible 
2 Minimal 
3 Normal 
4 Above average 
5 Major 
Table 6 
Total Payments Received by ti 
(without side payments) 
Tn T1 T2 T3 
ni 2 6 2 
Normal ϕi 11 8.6 11 
Maximal ϕi 21 16.2 21 
Minimal ϕi 0 0 0 
Table 8 
Statistics for 100 non-consecutive day span 
  λ1 λ2 
  Leader present Leader not 
present 
α1 SDH met 89 % 81% 
α2 SDH not met (by 
more than 5 m.) 42 % 88 % 
α3 Time to spare 30 m. – 40 m. 15 min. 
α4 Usage of time to 
spare 
Helping afternoon 
staff (94%) 
Socializing 
(72 %) 
 Daily Com. Average of Interactions 
α5 Work related 10 13 
α6 No-work related 49 73 
Table 7 
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Figures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Values for AL of TAL 
v(adati = lti) v(AL) v(adati = lti) v(AL) v(adati = lti) v(AL) 
0 ∅ 1 2 2 1 
0.1 20 1.1 1.818 2.1 0.952 
0.2 10 1.2 1.667 2.2 0.909 
0.3 6.667 1.3 1.538 2.3 0.870 
0.4 5 1.4 1.429 2.4 0.833 
0.5 4 1.5 1.333 2.5 0.8 
0.6 3.333 1.6 1.25 2.6 0.769 
0.7 2.857 1.7 1.176 2.7 0.741 
0.8 2.5 1.8 1.111 2.8 0.714 
0.9 2.222 1.9 1.053 2.9 0.690 
Table 10 
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Game 5
Core in a game with three teams using CFE
û {(T1, T2, T3)} = 527.13
T1
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T3
T1 - T2
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Figure 6 
Game 3
Core in a game with three teams using CFE
û {(T1, T2, T3)} = 363.332
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Figure 4 
Game 4
Core in a game with three teams using CFE
û {(T1, T2, T3)} = 130.834
T1
 
-
 
T3
T1 - T2
T2
 
-
 T3
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
 
Figure 5 
Game 1
Core in a game with three teams using the 
value of the game u {(T1, T2, T3)} = 3
T1
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T2
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Figure 2 
Game 2
Core in a game with three teams using CFE
û {(T1, T2, T3)} = 283.33
T1
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T3
T1 - T2
T2
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 T3
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Figure 3 
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